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1. Introduction 
Approximately 30 000 students graduate from universities and colleges in Norway each year. 
It is commonly believed that graduates have more opportunities in the labour market and are 
likely to enter high-paid jobs. An individual’s decision to pursue higher education can be seen 
as an attempt to enhance productive capabilities. In a competitive market, workers are paid 
according to their productivity. Human capital theory predicts that individuals make 
systematic investments in higher education by forgoing earnings early in their careers in order 
to increase expected future lifetime earnings. However, making causal statements on the 
relationship between education and earnings is difficult. Education is subject to individual 
choice and those who take part in higher education may differ from those who do not. This 
study aims at analysing the variation in pecuniary returns to education across different 
subpopulations using detailed information on individual earnings, education, and a number of 
other observable characteristics, taking into account the endogeneity of educational choices 
and sector participation. The human capital earnings framework developed by Becker (1964) 
and Mincer (1958, 1974) is utilized.  
 
Our approach has the notable features that it aims at estimating well-defined parameters of 
interest that can under certain conditions be given causal interpretations, and secondly, unlike 
most other studies on wage differentials, considers a wider set of endogeneity problems. 
Using microeconometric methods, we formalize a number of selection problems in the 
earnings regression framework. A question we pose in the empirical analysis is whether and 
to what extent our estimates of returns to education change when we allow for one or more 
sources of endogeneity. In addition to the well-know problem of non-random labour force 
participation, individual choices of schooling and occupational sector are also considered. 
Greater functional form flexibility is allowed through non-linear returns to education across 
years of schooling, educational fields and interaction-effects between schooling and work-
experience. Unlike earlier studies on educational returns in Norway that are restricted to full-
time workers because of insufficient data on individual working hours, we consider the 
returns to education on hourly wages for a much larger population. The wage returns to 
education are also likely to be better indicators of the relative increase in worker productivity, 
because crude measures of full-time work have been used in the earlier studies. 
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Our primary data source is Statistics Norway's Wage Statistics, comprising a series of cross-
sectional micro datasets containing around 1.2 million individuals for 2001. The data on 
public sector employees is taken from administrative registers covering all employed workers. 
For employees in privately registered enterprises, the data are based on an annual stratified 
random sampling of enterprises conducted by Statistics Norway. Depending on the worker’s 
employment industry, between 30 and 90 per cent of private sector employees are covered. 
The datasets contain information on years of schooling, industry, educational field, age, sex, 
and municipality of residence, apart from a number of earnings components such as average 
monthly paid salaries, variable additional allowances, bonuses, commissions, and contracted 
weekly working hours. On the basis of these measures, we are able to construct gross average 
hourly wages that are then used in the wage regressions. All estimations are performed in SAS 
8.2 and STATA 10.   
 
We find significant variation in the estimated returns to education across gender and sector, 
with OLS estimates ranging between 4.8 and 7.8 percent. However, there is strong evidence of 
non-linearity in returns across schooling level and education fields for all population groups 
we consider. Interaction effects between education and experience are also present, leading to 
a rejection of the standard log-linear Mincer wage equation. Selection effects are found to be 
significant, though of a moderate size. In general the OLS estimates are upward biased for the 
public sector, suggesting positive sorting into the labour market. However, our estimates 
indicate a negative selection bias for the private sector. The magnitude (and the direction) of 
the selection bias varies considerably across different educational groups. When taking into 
account endogeneity of schooling, we find that the OLS estimates are significantly downward 
biased, and that the bias increases further when we account for sector-participation.  
 
This study comprises of a methodological and an empirical section. Section 2.1 outlines the 
theoretical framework, followed by Section 2.2 providing an overview of the various theories 
of investment in human capital. In Section 2.3, various econometric problems related to 
earnings regressions are outlined. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. Section 3.1 starts 
with an introduction to the estimation problem, earlier studies and data sources. OLS estimates 
are given in Section 3.2, while Section 3.3 considers the problems of endogeneity and 
selection bias. Section 4 concludes this study. Variable definitions, descriptive statistics and 
estimation results are given in the appendix. 
2
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2. Theory and Method 
2.1 Introduction 
Economists use the concept of human capital to denote an individual's stock of productive 
knowledge, acquired through formal education and post-school learning, which enables him 
to indulge more abundantly in labour market activities.1 Essentially, the human capital theory 
tells us that human beings perceive a positive relation between productive capacities and life-
time earnings, and thus, being rational income-maximizing individuals, decide on whether to 
forego current earnings in order to improve their productive capacities and achieve higher 
future earnings prospects.2 A credible strength of this approach is that it enables the researcher 
to calculate the potential stock of productive knowledge for an individual, based on proxy 
measures such as the costs of schooling, and analyse the incremental increases in earnings 
following increases in the human capital stock. This has given rise to a vast empirical 
literature in the field of labour economics documenting ‘rates of return’ to schooling, where 
the underlying hypothesis is that education is an investment that receives a pecuniary return in 
the labour market.    
 
The conceptual framework of the theory of investment in human capital is based on the 
seminal works of Becker (1964, 1967), Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1958, 1974). 
However, these initial contributions are motivated somewhat differently. The formal life-
cycle model of investment in human capital can be traced to Ben-Porath, who analyses the 
choice of schooling and lifetime earnings in a dynamic optimisation framework. This 
structural model is further expanded in Rosen (1976) and Heckman (1976). However, these 
models are difficult to apply in an empirical analysis. Mincer (1958) assumes identical 
abilities and opportunities for all individuals and employs the principle of equalizing 
differences to derive a simple relation between earnings and schooling. This allows us to 
                                                 
1 The term productive knowledge may here refer to skills, ideas, or earning power that an individual acquires. Rosen (1987) 
provides an overview of the concept of human capital. Blaug (1976) also includes improvement in health, information 
retrieval, job search and migration as sources of the overall accumulation of human capital. Unlike an improvement in 
health, which may directly increase the productivity of the individual, the last three components function indirectly through 
better matching of worker’s capacities to the demanded job skills.     
2 The signalling theory also postulates a similar relation between education and earnings. It says that education may have a 
value in the labour market because it may act as a signal of ability or other productivity enhancing factors, independent of 
the direct effect on productivity. We will ignore such effects in this analysis; see Riley (2001) for an overview.     
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easily locate the rate of returns to schooling. Meanwhile, Becker (1967) studies schooling 
choices and individual returns to schooling as the outcome of supply and demand interactions 
in a simpler structural model.  
 
Despite these apparent conceptual differences between the theories, there is an underlying 
hedonic interpretation of the labour market. There are costs attached to undertaking schooling: 
direct educational costs, such as tuition fees, expenses on books, etc and opportunity costs, 
restricted mainly to foregone earnings during the schooling period. Thus, the worker would 
find additional schooling advantageous only if there is a compensation associated with higher 
education, such as sufficiently higher lifetime earnings. In the long-run, employers would be 
willing to give higher earnings to schooled workers only if they are more productive than less 
schooled workers. In a competitive equilibrium, the supply and demand for workers of each 
schooling level should equate and workers should have no incentives to alter their schooling 
level. The relationship between lifetime earnings and schooling is then determined in this 
equilibrium.3         
 
In Section 2.2, some alternative approaches to the theory of investment in human capital are 
presented. A theory-consistent econometric specification of the human capital earnings 
function deduced by Mincer (1974) is discussed in Section 2.3. We also touch upon some 
methodological issues recurrent in the literature on schooling returns and present some recent 
contributions to the methodology of human capital earnings functions. 
2.2 Models of human capital investment  
2.2.1 The equalizing differences model 
One of the earliest contributions to the human capital theory is Mincer (1958), who uses the 
principle of compensating differences to explain why persons with different levels of 
schooling receive different earnings over their lives. Occupations differ in the amount of 
schooling required. Meanwhile, individuals are assumed to be ex ante identical in terms of 
attributes that may affect their earnings and choices of schooling, such as abilities, 
opportunities, and preferences over non-pecuniary attributes of occupations and educational 
fields. However, individuals may choose to have different levels of schooling. The model also 
                                                 
3 For a thorough discussion of hedonic earnings equations, see Rosen (1974) and Willis (1986, 527-529).  
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assumes that the credit markets are perfect, there are no direct schooling costs (i.e. all 
investment costs are time costs), the rate of return is exogenously given to the individual, no 
further human capital investments are undertaken after completion of schooling (i.e. no on-
the-job training), the flow of individual earnings is constant throughout the working-life, there 
is zero depreciation in the human capital stock, and the span of working life is constant across 
various schooling groups. Changes in macroeconomics conditions that may affect the 
worker’s productivity and earnings during the life cycle are also excluded. The main 
prediction of the model is that the present value of net lifetime earnings of an individual who 
has s years of education and one who for instance has zero years of education should equate in 
order to have multiple schooling outcomes as optimising strategies in the population.  
 
The present value of lifetime earnings for an individual with s years of education ( sV ) can be 
denoted by 
 ,
1
1 1
s
T
s
sT
st
s
t
s YR
RRYRV ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−==
++
=
∑  
where T is the constant span of working life, rR +≡ 11  is the discount factor with r being the 
externally determined interest rate,  sY  denotes annual earnings of an individual with s years 
of schooling, while t is the time unit measured in years. Similarly, the present value of 
lifetime earnings for an individual with zero years of education 0V  is found. Equating it to sV  
yields ss rYY )1(0 +=  which after taking logarithms and approximating becomes  
.ln)1ln(lnln 00 srYrsYYs +≈++=                  (2.1) 
Given the assumptions summarized above, equation (2.1) follows almost directly from a 
tautology of present value of earning streams. Thus, the percentage increase in earnings is 
proportional to the absolute differences in the time spent at school, with r as the coefficient of 
proportionality. This leads us to the prevalent interpretation of the semi-elasticity of yearly 
earnings with respect to schooling as the internal rate of return that equates lifetime earnings 
streams for different educational choices and should be equal to the interest rate used by 
individuals as their discount rate in equilibrium. Apart from the equalization of lifetime 
earnings, there is little economic substance in this procedure that may enable us to explain the 
earnings-schooling relationship. For instance, the model does not tell us anything about the 
circumstances that induce individuals to engage in skills accumulation or why they chose their 
given schooling level. 
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2.2.2 The accounting identity model 
Mincer (1974) develops another model that is motivated by life cycle dynamics of earnings, 
but yields an algebraically similar empirical specification of the earnings equation. The model 
emphasizes the relationship between observed earnings, potential earnings, and human capital 
investment, for both formal schooling and on-the-job investment. Individuals are ex ante 
heterogeneous and there is also variation in the returns to schooling in the population. As 
earlier, this model also suggests that post-school investment has some alternative costs that 
need to be accounted for. We may define the observed earnings for an individual with a given 
education some period t after he has joined the labour force as ,ttt CEY −≡  where tE  denotes 
earning capacity (or what the worker would have earned had there been no post-school 
investment in the current period), while tC  are the resources devoted to on-the-job training in 
period t. Post-school investment yields a return only in the subsequent period. Thus, potential 
earnings can be expressed as 
( )11 1 1 1 0 0(1 ) 1 ,tt t t t t jjE E rC E rk E rk−− − − − == + = + = Π +  
where jk  is defined as the ratio of investment costs jC  to gross earnings jE  in period j and 
can be interpreted as the time-equivalent value of investment costs.4 Introducing the 
investment ratio in this manner implies that workers allocate all of their time either on work 
or post-school training.5 The third equality follows from backwards recursion. Assuming that 
the rate of return to post-school investment is constant over the life span and investment costs 
equate earning capacity during schooling (so that 1=jk  for sj ≤ ), we can take logarithm of 
the above expression and express earning capacity in period t as   
1
0
1
0
ln ln ln(1 ) ln(1 )
       ln ,
t
t s p j
j s
t
s p j
j s
E E s r r k
E sr r k
−
=
−
=
= + + + +
≈ + +
∑
∑
    
where sr  is the schooling rate of return and pr  can be interpreted as the return to the 
cumulative time-equivalent post-school investments before period t. The last approximation is 
for small sr  and .pr  To simplify matters ever more, it may be assumed that investment ratio 
                                                 
4 Using the definition of observed earnings and the equation for potential earnings and post-school investment, we can easily 
deduce the relation 1 1(1 ) .j j jY Y r C Cj − −= + + −   
5 Problems concerning interpersonal valuation of leisure and allocation of time are not considered. We assume exogenously 
fixed labour supply in rest of the analysis. 
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declines linearly with years of experience: ( )10 ps p Pk k −+ =  where 0p t s= − ≥  is the amount of 
work experience at year t, 00 >k  is the initial investment ratio and P is the total period of 
positive net investments (assumed to be independent of years of schooling). Under these 
assumptions, the relationship between potential earnings, schooling and experience is given 
by  
 0 0 20 0ln ln .2 2
p p
s x s p
r k r k
E E r s r k p p
P P+
⎛ ⎞= + + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Recalling that observable earnings are potential earnings less investment costs, the 
relationship can also be expressed as the following well-known Mincer earnings function 
  
0 0
0 0 20
0 0 0
ln ln ln 1 1 ln 1
   ln .
2 2
s p s p s p
p p
s p
p pY E k E k
P P
r k r kk       E k r s r k p p
P P P
+ + +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − − ≈ − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= − + + + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
              (2.2) 
While the schooling function in (2.1) follows by equalizing of lifetime earnings, the earnings 
function in (2.2) enshrines a hypothesis about the optimal post-school investment path. The 
schooling model given in (2.1) can be regarded as a simplified version of (2.2) under the 
conditions that there is no post-school investment, the only costs of schooling are foregone 
earnings, and that each individual faces a constant interest rate. The model (2.2) presents 
some new insights. Wage dispersion across individuals is now explained by variation in 
schooling and post-school training. The schooling coefficient should now be interpreted as the 
average rate of return across all schooling investment and not, in general, as a marginal 
internal rate of return that is appropriate for evaluating the optimality of educational 
investments. It must also be noted that the intercept and slope coefficients depend on 
parameters such as 0 0( , , , )p sE k r r  that may vary across individuals. This motivates the random 
coefficients specification of the earnings function given in Mincer (1974). It should also be 
noted that the composite experience coefficients cannot be given a simple intuitive 
interpretation (such as "returns to years of experience") and would depend on the returns to 
cumulative time-equivalent post-school investments pr , initial investment ratio 0k , and the 
total period of positive net investments P. 
2.2.3 Market for human capital investments 
Becker (1967) studies the individual choices of schooling as outcomes of the interaction 
between supply and demand for investments in human capital, considering factors such as 
7
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individual ability, tastes, and family wealth as the determinants of schooling choices. 
Underlying in the analysis is a concept of optimal investment in human capital related to 
marginal rates of returns and costs of undertaking the investments. The credibility of this 
approach is that it provides a framework within which it is possible to study the circumstances 
that induce workers to engage in skills accumulation. This enables the researcher to explicitly 
model heterogeneity in the individual schooling decisions.  
 
The main assumptions of this model are that the earnings of a person that are unrelated to 
human capital investment (denoted by 0E  in the previous section) are independent of their 
schooling choices and can be neglected and, secondly, human capital is homogeneous in the 
sense that all units are perfect substitutes in production for each other and thus add the same 
amount to earnings. The model also abstracts from the problems of uncertainty in future 
outcomes. For a particular person, the demand for human capital is given by the marginal 
benefit of accumulating human capital, measured by the rate of return on the educational 
investment. Meanwhile, the effective marginal financing cost of human capital accumulation 
is measured by the rate of interest and represents the supply curve of capital.  
 
The marginal rate of return depends on the marginal returns and the marginal production costs 
of investment, and is assumed to decline with the amount of human capital investment. The 
embodiment of human capital and the limitation on human memory capacity and physical size 
are the main reason for the declining marginal rate of return. Producing additional capital 
results in increasing marginal production costs. This result is analogous to the concept of 
diminishing returns in capital theory. Another peculiar aspect of human capital investment is 
that an increase in the amount invested usually corresponds to an increase in the time spent 
investing. This leads to production costs because of foregone earnings during the investment 
period. Because of finite lifetimes, and therefore shorter lifespan to recover the potential 
returns, and higher time-valuation with increased capital accumulation, one may expect 
smaller marginal benefits and higher production costs at later stages of life. This provides a 
fairly strong case for declining marginal rate of returns. 
 
The marginal cost of financing an additional unit of capital is increasing in the amount of 
human capital accumulated. The capital markets are assumed segmented with the existence of 
local and federal subsidies, transaction costs and legal limitations. Although certain sources of 
8
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funds are cheaper than others, the amounts available to any person from the cheaper sources 
are usually rationed since the total demand for the funds tend to exceed their supply. The 
positive inclination of the supply curve illustrates the point that when a person wants to 
finance more of the human capital investment, the cheapest fund are utilized first, but 
eventually the individual has to use expensive sources.  
 
The equilibrium outcome of this model is that agents select a path that maximizes the present 
value of the difference between the benefits and costs of undertaking schooling. However, 
since both the marginal benefits and financing costs of schooling depend on the path of capital 
accumulation, the demand and supply curves would neither be uniquely determined nor 
independent of each other. Becker (1967) assumes that own time and hired inputs are used in 
fixed proportions to produce human capital, and that a unit of hired inputs is available at a 
given price (foregone earnings) up to a certain maximum amount, beyond which no time is 
available at any price. This enables the interpretation of the educational investment at the 
intersection point between the demand and supply curves as the optimal accumulation path. 
Corresponding to the optimal accumulation path is the optimal investment period.  
 
Within this general framework, the differences in total human capital investment and rates of 
return can be explained as the result of variation in individual capacities and/or opportunities. 
While personal abilities (or IQ) may affect the benefits or costs of producing human capital 
and thereby alter the demand conditions, differences in family background or other factors 
determining individual opportunities may lead to variation in financing costs and enter the 
analysis by changing the supply conditions. Becker’s contribution holds significant 
importance because it enables us to systematically formulate and analyse the labour market 
implications of the two prevalent approaches in the policy debate concerning schooling, 
namely equality of opportunity and equality of ability.  
 
Rosen (1977) incorporates these basic concepts and presents a reinterpretation of the 
schooling model under the conditions that there are no post-school investments, constant 
interest rate, and that costs of schooling are fully captured by forgone earnings.6 The simple 
version of Mincer’s schooling function in (2.1) can be regarded as defining a set of iso-wealth 
curves in (ln , )Y s  with slopes equal to the rate of interest. The iso-wealth curve states that all 
                                                 
6 See Willis (1986) for a discussion of Rosen’s model. Also, Card (2001) presents a model with utility maximization and 
consumption choice that yields a similar decomposition of earnings-variation into inequality of abilities and opportunities. 
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choices of years of schooling along this curve yield the same lifetime earnings. Rosen (1976) 
assumes that the relationship between schooling and earnings can be given by a continuous 
function of the form 
ln ( ) ( ; ),Y s h s A=                    (2.3) 
where A is some measure of exogenously given economic ability. While the schooling 
function in (2.1) enshrines the idea that in equilibrium individuals have no incentives to 
deviate from their schooling choice, the function (2.3) represents a hypothesis about the 
technology of human capital production. 7 Underlying is a concept of homogenous labour, 
such that persons with more schooling and/or ability have more efficiency units of labour to 
rent in the market.  
 
The optimal schooling choice is given by the following problem: 
max ( )
r
eesYdtesYsV
rTrssT
s
rt
−−+
− −== ∫ 1)()()(  s.t. 
        { }( ) exp ( ; ) .Y s h s A=  
The first-order condition for this problem implies that the individual should continue 
schooling until the marginal rate of return is equal to the interest rate; ' ( ; ) .sh s A r=  Existence 
of an interior solution to this problem requires diminishing returns of schooling in producing 
embodied skills (i.e. 0ssh < ). The optimality condition gives schooling as a function of the 
individual’s ability and the rate of interest, * ( , ).s s A r=  By inserting this in (2.3) we get the 
optimal earnings, ln ( *) ( ( , ); ).Y s h s A r A=  In general, the opportunities for financing 
investments in education vary across individuals. In order to capture this variation, we may 
allow the rate of interest faced by the individual to depend on a set of exogenous variables Z, 
such as family background and non-human wealth, so that optimal earnings are given by 
ln ( *) ( ( , ( )); )Y s h s A r Z A= . Within this model, variation in observed earnings can be fully 
explained by inequality of abilities and opportunities in the population.8  
                                                 
7 Implicit in the human capital production function is the assumption that ability influences the marginal rate of return to 
investment. If schooling and ability can be regarded as additively separable in (2.3), the optimal schooling choice would be 
independent of individual’s abilities. In that case, the variation in schooling choices across individuals would be the result 
of variation in the rates of interest. The rate of return to schooling can then be identified without knowledge of individual 
abilities. See section 2.3 for problems concerning self-selection and problems of identification in the earnings function.    
8 A generalization of the concept of inequality of ability is comparative advantage, which allows for multidimensional 
variation in the skills. For instance, there is a possibility of occupation-specific skills variation among the workers. A 
related problem is that of sorting or dynamic self-selection, often coexisting in the presence of inter-temporal learning of 
skills by workers and employees. An important contribution to this literature is Gibbons et al (2005).    
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2.2.4 Life-cycle determination of earnings 
The first formal representation of the human capital accumulation process as an intertemporal 
optimisation problem is due to Ben-Porath (1967). This structural model of life-time earnings 
is further expanded in Rosen (1976) and Heckman (1976). Surveys of this literature are 
presented in Weiss (1987) and Cunha et al (2006). As static models, the life-cycle models of 
earnings determination state that workers can influence their earnings through various 
investment activities, such as schooling or on-the-job training. By offering current earnings, 
they hope to increase future earnings potential. What differentiates life-cycle models from the 
static framework of Becker-Mincer models is the explicit modelling of the dynamics of 
human capital accumulation and its relation to the individual earnings profiles, where 
technological or biological processes such as human capital depreciation or aging of the 
human body are accounted for. The theory enables us to explain a number of regularities in 
the earnings literature, such as a life-cycle earnings profile that increases at early ages and 
declines towards the end of the working period. 
 
The simple model assumes that all firms are identical and compete for workers by offering job 
opportunities that specify both wage and working hours. Workers have some initial human 
capital endowment, but are able to attain on-the-job training. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between current earnings and human capital accumulation and thereby future earning 
potential. Firms decide the number of workers they should employ, while the workers decide 
on the hours of work and the intensity of human capital accumulation.9 Workers are 
distinguished by their human capital endowment and the time they spend at the firm. 
However, it is assumed that workers with different skills are perfect substitutes in the 
production of the composite good. 
 
Equilibrium in this model is attained when the marginal product of hiring a worker is equal to 
the cost. In order for this to occur, the rental rate on human capital must adjust. When each 
worker has allocated his time among jobs with varying training intensity levels given his 
current human capital endowment, an efficient earnings frontier ( , , )Y Y K K h= &  is generated, 
where Y is current earnings net of explicit training costs, h is time spent at work or at school, 
K is the current human capital endowment and K&  is the change in human capital following 
                                                 
9 Schooling investment can be considered a special case of this model when the human capital accumulation intensity is 
equal to one and current earnings are equal to zero.   
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the current investment. The human capital accumulation process can be captured in a 
production function, ( , , ),K G K h x=&  where x represents the training intensity level. Hence a 
worker with human capital endowment K, who works h hours in a firm with training intensity 
level x, will earn (1 ) ,x RKh−  where R is the rental rate of capital. In order to simplify the 
model, we may regard labour supply as exogenous. Thus, we focus only on the allocation of 
time in the market, taking the total amount of non-leisure time as predetermined. The worker 
has a fixed lifetime of length T and operates in an economy with a perfect capital market 
facing a fixed rate of interest, r. The worker’s choice of the periodic training intensity profile, 
( ),x t  generates an optimal path for human capital accumulation.  
 
The problem facing the worker can thus be outlined as maximizing the lifetime earnings given 
the human capital production function:  
max 
0
(1 )   . .
T
rtRhK x e dt s t−−∫   
        0( , , ),   (0) ,   0 1,K G K h x K K x= = ≤ ≤&  
where t is the worker’s age, h is a predetermined function of t and the function ( )x t  is the 
object of choice. The solution to this control problem is characterised by the maximization of 
the discounted earnings of the worker at each age. There is no closed form solution to this 
problem, unless the human capital production function is given a specific functional form. 
Presenting the whole solution procedure is outside the scope of this study, however some 
general results can be stated: Initially the worker invests at full intensity ( 1x = ), however 
over the years the training intensity declines and eventually reaches zero. Earning capacity 
increases at the range with high investment intensity and declines in the range with low 
investment intensity, due to a positive rate of depreciation. Observed earnings increase during 
the first phase because of increased human capital accumulation and reduced investment 
intensity.10 
                                                 
10 Weiss (1987) compares a number of different specifications of the human capital production function.  The model can be 
extended to allow endogenous labor supply, uncertainty and heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, as discussed in 
Cunha et al (2006).  
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2.3 Estimating Returns to Education 
2.3.1 A theory-consistent econometric specification 
The primary objective of this study is to estimate the pecuniary returns to education on 
individual earnings. A major concern is whether these estimates can be given causal 
interpretations. Making causal statements based on observed data requires prior assumptions. 
The researcher needs to (i) explicitly formulate theoretical models providing economic 
relations between well-defined entities, (ii) specify empirical functions reflecting the 
postulated theoretical relations, usually in terms of certain parameters of interest, and (iii) 
highlight the assumptions that need to be placed on the underlying data generating process to 
allow identification of economic relations from the available data. In this section, we will be 
concerned with points (ii) and (iii), and discuss how these issues influence our estimation 
strategy. Section 2.3.2 introduces the concept of individual level causal effects in a potential 
outcomes model, and defines some conventional parameters of interest. In Section 2.3.3, we 
discuss the importance of functional form restrictions and the problems related to 
misspecification. Section 2.3.4 presents a thorough discussion of selection bias, with an 
introduction to the multiple-selection problem. Estimation strategies used to correct selection 
bias are discussed in Section 2.3.5.   
 
Econometric specification 
 
Using the theoretical relationship (2.2), we specify the econometric earnings-schooling 
equation as 
2
0 1 ,i s i i i iy s p pα β γ γ ε= + + + +                                          (2.4) 
where iy  are log-earnings for an individual i with schooling level s and potential experience 
p, and sβ  can be interpreted as the rate of return to schooling.11 (2.4) is the famous Mincer 
earnings equation and has been widely used in the empirical literature.12 The residual is 
assumed to fulfill the restriction , 0,i i iE s pε⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  implying that no omitted variables are 
correlated with schooling and/or experience.  
                                                 
11 The reduced-form parameters 0 1( , )γ γ  capture the structural parameters 0( , , )pk r P  in (2.2) and cannot be given a simple 
interpretation. Estimates of experience coefficients can be used to estimate the return to the cumulative time-equivalent 
post-school investments pr  if one of the structural parameters, for instance the whole period of net positive post-school 
investments P, is fixed.   
12 Recent surveys of this literature are found in Card (1999), Harmon el al (2003) and Blundell et al (2005). 
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Specifying an econometric earnings-schooling relationship is not unproblematic, since a 
number of theoretical frameworks can be used to model the same relations. We focus 
exclusively on the Mincer-Becker-Rosen setup, assuming that individuals maximize life-time 
earnings by choosing years of schooling and follow a given post-school training intensity 
profile. This generates an earnings profile with the wage rate being equal to the marginal 
productivity of labour. The parameter of interest is the internal rate of return on schooling, 
earlier defined as the capital interest rate that equates the present values of the earning streams 
for different choices of schooling levels by the agents. Two sets of assumptions need to be 
fulfilled before earnings regressions can be said to provide consistent estimates of the internal 
rate of return. As outlined in the previous sections, the earnings function (2.2) is deduced 
from strong behavioural assumptions on the agents in the economy. Secondly, parameters in 
the empirical counterpart of the earnings-schooling relation can be identified from the 
available data only under certain conditional independence restrictions. Here, we repeat the 
theoretical assumptions made in earlier sections, while the more econometric issues are 
discussed in the remaining sections.    
 
Internal rate of return 
 
When individuals chose between different schooling levels, they take account of direct costs, 
including both monetary and effort costs as well as indirect costs. In addition, income taxes 
and length of working life may depend on the schooling level. These factors were not 
accounted for while deducing the earning function (2.2). Heckman et al (2006) use a "direct" 
solution method to illustrate the importance of such assumptions. For an individual with 
earnings ),( xsY  having schooling s and experience x, the present-value of the lifetime 
earnings is given by 
 ,),()1()(
0
)1(
)(
0
)()1( ∫∫ −−
−
+−− −−=
s
rz
ssT
sxr dzvedxxsYesV τττ  
where v denotes private tuition and other non-pecuniary costs of schooling, τ  is a 
proportional income tax rate, r is before-tax interest rate and )(sT  is the schooling-dependent 
last age of earnings. 13 It can be shown that maximizing the above term with respect to s and 
rearranging the resulting terms gives 
                                                 
13 Apart from changes in the opportunity costs of schooling, the variable v also captures a number of non-pecuniary costs or 
benefits associated with schooling (mental pressure or stress) or having a high-skilled job (status). 
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where rr )1(~ τ−=  is the after-tax interest rate.14 Term 1 is the effect of the change in working-
life associated with additional schooling. Term 2 is the weighted average effect of schooling 
on log-earnings, while term 3 is the cost of tuition and effort costs as a fraction of lifetime 
income measured at age s. The parameter r~  can be interpreted as a marginal internal rate of 
return to schooling that takes into account tuition costs, changes in the retirement age and the 
structure of schooling returns over the life cycle. This rate of return should equal the after-tax 
interest rate with credit markets, once all costs and benefits from schooling are considered.  
Now, if we assume that v = 0 (i.e., no tuition or effort costs), 1)(' =sT  (no loss of work span 
from schooling), and that the schooling and experience components of earnings are 
multiplicatively separable,15 so that )()(),( xsxsY ϕμ=  (i.e., parallel log-earnings experience 
profiles across schooling levels), then ).(/)('~ ssr μμ=  If all these assumptions hold for all s, 
then earnings must be log linear in schooling and ,)0()( sses ρμμ =  so that ,~ sr ρ=  i.e., a linear 
fit of log-earnings on schooling provides an estimate of the internal rate of return to 
schooling. In general, the difference between the internal rate of return and the schooling 
coefficient can be decomposed into three parts: a life-earnings effect (Term 1), the deviation 
of present schooling returns from the overall life-time average (Term 2), and existence of 
schooling costs that are not offset by earnings during schooling (Term 3).   
 
To summarize, we are assuming that schooling precedes work, individuals predict their future 
earnings with certainty, that our earnings measure captures the full benefits of the schooling 
investment (i.e. no differences in non-pecuniary advantages across jobs requiring different 
educations), the only costs of schooling are foregone earnings (i.e. no direct costs), no 
externalities or general equilibrium effects of taking higher education, the economy is in a 
steady state without any wage or productivity growth, and that the log-earnings function is 
linear in schooling and additively separable in schooling and experience.  
                                                 
14 We assume that there is no uncertainty about future earnings. Alternatively, we may assume that individuals look at the 
mean of the log earnings distribution when forecasting their earnings and ignore any potential person-specific deviations 
from that profile, and thereby base their schooling decisions on ex ante rates of return. See Heckman et al (2006) for an 
extensive discussion of uncertainty and expectations formation in this context.   
15 The earnings function derived in (2.2) embeds this property because a specific human capital accumulation profile is 
assumed. The investment ratio is equal to one during the initial schooling period and declines linearly during the fixed 
period of working life, with the post-school investment ratio being independent of the level of schooling. 
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2.3.2 Potential outcomes and causal effects 
In order to fully explore the importance of functional form restrictions and endogeneity of 
choice variables, we can formulate the individual schooling-earnings relation in a potential 
outcomes model.16 For brevity, we focus only on the role of schooling in earnings 
determination and overlook work experience and other covariates in the potential outcomes 
model. The underlying motivation for this modelling framework is that schooling choices are 
likely to be the result of systematic decisions, so that the sample of individuals who chose a 
given level of schooling is not random. Simply comparing differences in outcomes for 
graduates and high school dropouts will therefore not give the causal effect of high school on 
earnings.  
 
Consider a situation where individuals choose between J schooling levels. The potential log-
earnings of an individual i with schooling level j is denoted by jiy . The actual schooling 
choice of individual i is given by iS . When an ordinal structure can be placed on the 
schooling levels, it is helpful to introduce the dummy variables jiS  and jiS%  defined as  
[ ]1ji iS S j= = , 
[ ]1ji iS S j= ≥% .17  
We are interested in the individual-level causal effects 1,j ji iy y
−−  being the change in potential 
log-earnings for an individual i by receiving schooling level j relative to j-1. The relation 
between observed log-earnings iy  and potential log-earnings 
j
iy  is given by 
 ( )1 1
1 2
.
J J
j j j
i i ji i i i ji
j j
y y S y y y S−
= =
= = + −∑ ∑ %                   (2.5) 
We may let the potential outcomes depend on both observable covariates iX  and unobserved 
factors ,jiu  such that ),( jiijji uXfy =  for all j. This specification is fairly general, allowing the 
log-earnings to differ not only across schooling levels for the same individual, but also across 
individuals having the same schooling level.18 To simplify, we assume additive separability 
                                                 
16 The potential outcomes model presented here is a modified version of Blundell et al (2005). 
17 The ordinal structure enables us to derive the marginal returns of an additional year of schooling in the potential outcome 
model. Otherwise, we may place a non-ordinal categorical structure on schooling and interpret the coefficients as the 
“cumulative” returns relative to some benchmark category, such as no education. An application of this is in the empirical 
part, where we construct educational groups by combining years of schooling and educational fields.   
18 However, we rule out spill-over or general equilibrium effects and effects of schooling-specific observable characteristics, 
so that ji iX X=  for all j. Thus, Rubin’s (1986) stable unit-treatment value assumption is satisfied. 
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between observable and unobservable factors, so that .)( jiijji uXmy +=  By inserting this 
expression in (2.5) we get 
 { } { }1 11 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) .
J J
j j
i i j i j i ji i i ji i
j j
y m X m X m X S u u S u−−
= =
= + − + − +∑ ∑% %  
The state-specific unobservable components of earnings can be written as ,ji i i jiu bν υ= + +  
for all j, with iν  representing unobservable individual traits that affect log-earnings equally at 
all schooling levels, level-specific unobservable marginal returns given by jib , and iυ  being 
the standard residual (capturing, say measurement errors). Thus, the above equation becomes 
 1 1
2
( ) ( ) ,
J
i i i ji i ji i i
j
y m X b X Sβ ν υ
=
= + + + +∑ %        (2.6) 
where 1 1( ) ( ) ( )ji i j i j i ji j iX m X m X b bβ − −≡ − + −  are individual i’s private returns from having 
received schooling level j relative to j-1. Following Angrist and Imbens (1995), the equation 
(2.6) is a heterogeneous returns model with variable treatment intensity. The set of parameter 
given by ( )ji iXβ  captures variation in marginal returns to schooling across N individuals and 
J schooling levels, through both observable and unobservable characteristics. We may 
consider some simplifications: If we place the restriction ( ) ,ji i jXβ β=  the model (2.6) 
reduces to a homogeneous returns model with non-linear marginal returns to schooling. By 
further imposing ββ =)( iji X  and 2 ,J ji ij S s= =∑ %  we get the standard homogeneous returns 
one-factor human capital model. When post-school investments are excluded, this 
corresponds to the model (2.4). 
 
Population-level parameters of interest 
 
The above modelling framework has similarities with the treatment-effect literature. An 
individual’s choice of schooling level j can be understood as a “treatment”, while the causal 
change in log-earnings brought about through this choice is the effect or treatment response. 
Similarly, the causal change 1j ji iy y
−−  is the individual-level treatment effect when we are 
comparing the outcome from treatment j with the outcome from treatment j-1. Constructing 
(2.6) for a given individual is impossible as we never observe the same individual in different 
states at the same point in time. To identify the causal effects comparisons across 
counterfactual states are needed. Usually, we must limit the analysis to averages of these 
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individual-level effects over some populations of interest. A parameter of interest is the 
(conditional) average treatment effect or ATE, defined as  
 ( ) ( )1( , 1| ) | ( ) | ,j ji i i ji i iATE j j x E y y X x E X X xβ−− ≡ − = = =  
where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of individuals, conditioning on 
covariates X associated with the observed individual characteristics. This is the effect of 
assigning an individual with schooling j-1 from a subpopulation conditional on X to schooling 
j, averaged over the factors that determine log-earnings but are not captured by X. Similarly, 
the unconditional expectation provides the average treatment effect for the overall population. 
Another parameter in this literature is the conditional average treatment effect on the treated 
or TT, defined as 
 ( ) ( )1( , 1| ) | 1, ( ) | 1, .j ji i ji i ji i ji iTT j j x E y y S X x E X S X xβ−− ≡ − = = = = =  
These parameters are the mean impact of assigning individuals having j-1 levels of schooling 
to level j for those who get treatment, conditional on X. We may also define a parameter for 
nonparticipants ( 0jiS = ), i.e. the treatment effect on the untreated  
 ( ) ( )1( , 1| ) | 0, ( ) | 0, .j ji i ji i ji i ji iTUT j j x E y y S X x E X S X xβ−− ≡ − = = = = =  
These parameters tell us how assigning more schooling to those who have not received it 
would affect their outcomes. The essential difference here is that while the TT and TUT 
parameters condition on individual choices, the ATE does not and is policy-invariant under 
weaker conditions (see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007)).  
 
Bias associated with unconditional means 
 
We may start by considering the simple estimator Mjβ  that computes the observed difference 
in unconditional means of log-earnings for individuals with schooling level j and j-1. 
( )
1
1
1 1 1
1
1
| 1 | 1
      | , 1 | , 1
      | , 1 | , 1 | , 1
      ( ) | , 1 | ,
M
j i ji i j i
X i i ji i i j i
j j j j
X i i i ji i i ji i i j i
j
X ji i i ji i i
E y S E y S
E E y X S E y X S
E E y y X S E y X S E y X S
E E X X S E y X
β
β
−
−
− − −
−
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ = − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = + = − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= = +⎣ ⎦ ( )
[ ]
1
11 | , 1
      ( , 1| ) bias term.
j
ji i i j i
X i
S E y X S
E TT j j X
−
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= − +
 
The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, while the second equality 
follows from the definition of observed earnings (2.5). As pointed out earlier, non-random 
schooling choices make it difficult to draw causal statements based on direct comparisons of 
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average log-earnings. This is captured in the bias term above. Generally, the bias from an 
OLS fit of log-earnings on years of schooling can be decomposed into two components: 
Specification bias and selection bias due to ‘selection on unobservables’ (i.e. through ,iν  iυ , 
or jib ). In the next sections, we will focus on problems of misspecification and selection in 
this general modelling framework and extend the discussion on the parameters of interest 
under various modifications of the human capital model.   
2.3.3 Specification bias 
For now, we disregard selection bias by simply assuming ,| | , 0i i ji i i jiE X S E X Sν υ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦% %  
in (2.6), and focus on the problem pertaining to specification bias. We may consider the 
estimator 1( ) | , 1 | , 1 ,
M
j i i i ji i i j iX E y X S E y X Sβ −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ = − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  that computes the observed 
difference in the conditional means of log-earnings for individuals with schooling level j and 
j-1. Under the conditional independence restrictions (‘selection on observables’), it follows 
that ( ) ( ) | , 1 .Mj i ji i i jiX E X X Sβ β⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦  Angrist and Krueger (1999) show that the OLS 
regression coefficient sβ  from a regression of log earnings on schooling gives a weighted 
average of the marginal effects ( )Mj iXβ , expressed as 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )
1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) | , | , Pr | 1 Pr | .
J J
M
s X j i j i X j i
j j
j i i i i i i i i i i i
E X X E X
X E S X S j E S X S j S j X S j X
β β μ μ
μ
−
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= ≥ − < ≥ − ≥
∑ ∑  
 
With heterogeneous marginal returns, the OLS estimator for the linear model depends on the 
distribution of schooling levels and other covariates in the population. The weighting formula 
above has a sum and an expectation. The inner sum provides a weighted average of ( )Mj iXβ  
across different schooling levels, given a particular value of X. This averaging matters if the 
marginal returns are nonlinear across schooling levels. The marginal returns are weighted 
using the functions ( ),j iXμ  that weight ( )Mj iXβ  for each j in proportion to the change in the 
conditional mean of schooling level and give proportionally more weight to schooling levels 
that are closer to the conditional sample median schooling level. The expectation then 
averages this sum according to the distribution of X. This averaging matters if the marginal 
returns vary across different subpopulations. It should be noted that the OLS estimates exclude 
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observations having [ ]Pr |i iS j X≥  equal to 0 or 1. These include values of X where 
schooling does not vary across observations. Thus, there is the problem of non-overlapping 
support of the observables.  
 
In order to explore the extent of heterogeneity in returns to schooling, one may estimate a 
model similar to (2.4) separately for different subpopulations with non-linear returns to 
schooling. A parametric estimation of (2.6) would require knowledge of the functional form 
of ( )j im X  at each j. The OLS fit would generally control linearly for the observable variables, 
and can potentially suffer from a specification bias if the true model contains higher order 
terms of the Xs, or interactions between Xs and schooling. It may seem obvious to specify an 
arbitrarily flexible estimation model to solve any specification bias, such as a fully saturated 
model of schooling levels and conditioning variables. Unless large datasets are available, one 
is likely to run into problems of dimensionality. However, there are some other alternative 
estimation methods available in the econometrics literatures, such as matching on 
conditioning variables and matching on propensity score.   
 
Matching 
 
The matching approach enables the researcher to construct comparison groups by carefully 
reweighting the observables on the common support. As the flexible regression approach 
above, matching does not solve the selection on unobservable characteristics. In the case of 
schooling returns, the counterfactual log-earnings for individual i with schooling level j are 
assumed to be independent of the schooling variable ,jiS  such that ,´ ijiji XSy ⊥  where j´ 
denotes non-treatment outcomes. This assumption of selection on observables requires that 
conditional on the observed attributes, the distribution of the counterfactual outcomes jy  in 
the treated group is the same as the observed distribution of jy  in the non-treated group. This 
implies ( , )i i ji iS Xν υ ⊥  in the case of (2.6) above. However, heterogeneous returns to 
schooling jib  can be correlated with the schooling decision ,jiS  if ( , )i i ji ib Xν υ ⊥  also holds. 
Thus, individuals may decide to acquire schooling on the basis of their unobserved individual-
specific returns, as long as this is uncorrelated with their conditional potential outcome for an 
alternative schooling choice. 
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General nonparametric matching methods allow very flexible specifications of ( )j im X  and 
can thereby avoid the potential specification bias associated with an OLS fit. Matching 
requires that for each treated observation { }( ),1: =∈ jii Siy  we can look for one or more non-
treated observations { }( )0: =∈ jii Siy  such that the non-treated observations correspond to the 
required counterfactual group.19 This assumes that there is a common support region for X 
where the treated and non-treated groups overlap. Usually, this is satisfied by the requirement 
( 1 ) 1,ji iP S X= <  which prevents X from being a perfect predictor of treatment status. 
Meanwhile, finding exact matches can be extremely difficult if X includes a wide range of 
variables. However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that the problem of high-dimensional 
matching can be simplified to the problem of finding treated and non-treated observations 
with the same one-dimensional propensity score for attaining treatment j, ( ).j ip X
20 The 
conditional independence assumption remains valid, as 0 ( ) 1j ip X< <  and ijiji XSy ⊥´  imply 
).(´ ijji
j
i XpSy ⊥  Thus, causal effects on earnings from different schooling levels can be 
drawn from comparisons within subpopulations defined by ( ).j ip X  After averaging across 
the relevant subpopulations, the average effect of having schooling level j relative to having 
schooling j-1 is given by 1 1( ), ( )
j j
X i i j i j iE E y y p X p X
−
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Although the matching method provides a more flexible estimation procedure compared to 
OLS, strong identifying assumptions are still called for. Firstly, depending on the set of 
conditioning variables, the identifying independence assumption can be controversial. In 
some situations, it may not be plausible to rule out selection on unobservables. For instance, 
using experimental data Smith and Todd (2005) show that propensity score matching 
estimates are highly sensitive to the set of variables included in the scores.21 Secondly, there is 
a possibility that there are no non-treatment observations with a similar propensity score for 
all the participants. The estimated treatment effect must then be redefined as the mean 
treatment effect for those treated falling within the common support. And finally, if the effect 
                                                 
19 When there are multiple treatment and non-treatment observation on the common support of X, some sort of weighting 
between the different observations can be done, such as nearest neighbour, calliper, or kernal-based matching. For instance, 
comparisons of twins or siblings earnings outcomes have been used to estimate returns to schooling. This can be seen as an 
application of calliper matching.    
20 The 'generalized' propensity score used in the multi-treatment case above is the probability of attending schooling level j 
given the observed characteristics (see Imbens (2000)). 
21 Other studies evaluating the matching methods are Heckman, Inchimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004). 
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of schooling differs across individuals who have received it, restricting the comparison to 
observations found on the common support may not give the mean treatment effect on the 
treated group. In comparison, the parametric models “solve” the common support problem by 
means of functional form assumptions to extrapolate outside the common support.    
2.3.4 Selection bias 
In most data generating processes, sampling rules other than random sampling are used to 
draw from some underlying population of interest. Such sampling rules may be outcomes of 
choice behaviour of agents being studied and/or decisions made by sample survey designers. 
In such cases, the researcher has a non-random sample of the overall population, i.e. there is 
selection bias. One type of identification problem is to recover the conditional probability 
distribution of the underlying population from an observed sample, in which the realizations 
of the conditioning variables are always observed but the realizations of outcomes are 
censored.22 This would usually require strong prior assumptions. For instance, we observe 
wages only for individuals participating in the labour market but we might be interested in the 
joint distribution of (potential) wages and schooling years for all persons whether or not they 
work. However, selection problems are more general and can occur in any context where 
different population groups are being compared and individuals pertaining to the different 
groups are not subject to random assignment. Job-search strategies, occupational choices, 
schooling attainment, migration, etc., are variants of selection problems that have been 
studied within the Mincer earnings regression framework.23  
 
As shown in the preceding section, unless strong conditional independence restrictions are 
placed on the residuals we would encounter problems of selection bias in estimating log-
earnings. In the econometric literature, the selection problem has been characterized in two 
ways: The traditional structural approach estimates decision rules derived from economic 
models in an attempt to recover the primitives of economic theory (technology and 
preferences). Given that the decision rules are correctly specified, the estimates of the 
primitives can be used to construct counterfactuals, and thereby identify causal effects. 
Commonly, a joint distribution of potential outcome and explanatory variables is specified 
                                                 
22 See chapter 2 in Manski (1995) for an introduction to the selection problem encountered in identifying the probability 
distributions of partially observed outcome variables.   
23 Widely cited applications of selection models are Lee (1978) on unionism, Willis and Rosen (1979) on schooling, 
Björklund and Moffitt (1987) on job training, Heckman and Sedlacek (1990) on sectoral choice and Pessino (1991) on 
migration. 
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and the observed distribution is deduced by introducing sampling rules through weighting 
functions.  However, the recent program-evaluation literature treats the selection problem as a 
missing data problem and attempts to use observable data to impute the relevant 
counterfactual outcomes.24 The current popularity of the experimental approach stems mainly 
precisely from the concern that the economic theory does not provide us the functional form, 
the distributional assumptions or what to control for in a regression analysis. Thereby, it is 
impossible to recover the primitives of economic theory.25 As emphasised by Angrist and 
Krueger (1999), the experimental approach seeks situations where one has a reasonable 
presumption that the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the variable of interest. Such 
situations may arise if the researcher can use random assignment, or if the forces of nature or 
human institutions provide something close to random assignment. By controlling for 
confounding variables, using before and after comparisons of the same agents, and by using 
instrumental variables as a source of exogenous variation, the experimental approach tries to 
mimic random assignment. Accordingly, a regression analysis is given a causal interpretation 
when the estimated coefficient approximates the causal effect that would have been revealed 
in a true experiment. The potential outcomes model and preceding discussion on the 
population-level parameters of interest is largely derived from the experimental literature.   
 
Ability bias and comparative advantage 
 
In Section 2.2.3, the concept of individual earnings ability was introduced within a human 
capital production function in the Rosen-Becker model. We also showed that optimal 
schooling and earnings depend on individual ability. Before we proceed, it may be important 
to restate what our concept of ability constitutes. One way of understanding ability is as an 
operational factor indicating intrinsic or natural talents that enable the individual to succeed. 
The main problem with this view is that there is no objective measure of an individual's 
intelligence. The closest we have are IQ-test scores or residuals from a linear fit of test scores 
on schooling. However, using such proxy measures that do not fully capture the unobservable 
ability may not solve the problem and may even increase the bias, as shown by Frost (1979).  
                                                 
24 Heckman (2001) provides a discussion of the distinction between structural modelling and treatment literature in the 
context of selection models.  
25 Thurow (1983, pp. 106-107) argues: "Economic theory almost never specifies what secondary variables (other than the 
primary ones under investigation) should be held constant in order to isolate the primary effects. ... When we look at the 
impact of education on individual earnings, what else should be held constant: IQ, work effort, occupational choice, and 
family background? Economic theory does not say. Yet the coefficients of the primary variables almost always depend on 
precisely what other variables are entered in the equation 'holding everything else constant'." 
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Another view is that ability is "excess earnings capacity" that is not captured by formal 
schooling or observable factors.26 This concept of ability may include factors such as 
motivation, attitude or other unobservable forces driving earnings. It is extremely hard to 
motivate a one-dimensional empirical counterpart for such concepts. Few observational 
studies have attempted to include factors other than test scores. In most cases the researcher 
does not have adequate measures of IQ and is forced to exclude the ability variable from the 
earnings regressions. Thus, individual earnings ability is one of the unobservable factors that 
are likely to explain schooling choices and earnings dispersion across individuals. Estimation 
is further complicated if we allow for comparative advantage or multi-dimensional skills 
variation. In that case, the schooling coefficient would not only be ridden by omitted ability 
bias, but the bias would vary across different subgroups.  
 
To illustrate this problem, let’s again consider the model (2.6). By separating the observable 
and unobservable factors we can write this as 
  ( ){ }1 1 1 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ,
i
J J
i i j i ji ji j i j j ji i i i
j j
y m X X S b b b b S b
ω
β ν υ− −
= =
= + + − − − + + +∑ ∑% %
14444444244444443
              (2.7) 
where 1 1( ) ( ) ( )j i j i j i j jX m X m X b bβ − −≡ − + −  are the average private returns to schooling level 
j relative to j-1 (ATE), and j jib E b⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  is the population mean of the unobservables. We 
assume that the functional forms of ( )j im X  are known for each j, so that it is possible to 
perform a correctly specified OLS regression. However, as long as there is correlation between 
jiS%  and the composite error term iω , i.e. ,|i i jiE X Sω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%  is non-zero, estimates from the OLS 
regression will be biased. As pointed out by Blundell et al (2005), such correlation may arise 
from different sources. The residual term iν  captures unobserved individual traits that affect 
log-earnings equally across all schooling levels (the absolute advantage). The standard ability 
bias arises from the likely correlation between iν  and .jiS%  If workers with higher earnings 
ability also acquire more schooling, this correlation will be positive and there will be an 
upward bias in the estimated average return. Meanwhile, another source of bias is through 
correlation between the unobserved individual returns jib (the comparative advantage) and the 
                                                 
26 In Griliches's (1977) words: "[Ability] is an unobserved latent variable that both drives people to get relatively more 
schooling and earn more income, given schooling, and perhaps also enables and motivates people to score better on various 
tests."   
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schooling decision given by .jiS%  Individuals may choose to pursue an education based on the 
knowledge of their own capabilities or interests specific to the chosen schooling level or field. 
These are unobserved by the researcher and hence cannot be controlled for. The direction of 
this bias is not clear and will depend on the average returns among the subpopulations with 
the different schooling levels. Another issue is measurement errors in the schooling variables 
jiS% , captured by ,iυ  that lead to downwards bias and could partially offset the upward ability 
bias, as emphasized by Griliches (1977). 
 
A multiple-selection model 
 
The data used by the researcher has been subject to a number of sample selection processes 
and could generate biased estimates even if schooling choices are random. For instance, 
individuals face the choice of participating in the labour force. The choice of working can be 
made arbitrarily flexible, by allowing the individual to work in different occupations and 
industries, with non-participation being one of the alternatives in this choice-set. While we 
observe schooling, location, and other demographic characteristics ( , )i jiX S  for each 
individual, irrespective of their participation in the labour force, an individual’s earnings are 
available only for his own choice of occupation. Thus, we are facing a situation with partial 
observation of the dependent variable. This becomes a problem when such censoring is non-
random. Individuals work when they choose to do so. The hourly wage rate a worker is 
offered influences the decision to work. By neglecting this dependence, we are assuming that 
information on individuals found in the data can be generalized to those outside the labour 
force.  
 
Considering multiple selection mechanisms simultaneously in the schooling returns model 
(2.7) is not straightforward. Maddala (1983) characterises this as a polychotomous-choice 
selection model. To give an illustration of the problem, we may consider the labour force 
participation decision of an individual in a latent variable model.27 Each individual is allowed 
to either work in private sector, public sector, or remain outside the labour force. For brevity, 
all outside options, such as self-employment, unemployment, or disability, are considered as 
non-participation. Our parameter of interest is still the average private returns to schooling 
( ),lj iXβ  now conditional both on choices of schooling j and sector l. By incorporating these 
                                                 
27 Mincer (1962), Gronau (1974) and Heckman and Willis (1977) are some of the early contributions to this literature, 
analysing labour force participation decisions of women.  
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choice mechanisms in the human capital model (2.7) we arrive at the system of equations 
given by (2.9).  
 
(2.9a) are the latent wage offers, expressing the potential wages that an individual is offered in 
the public sector 1iW  and in the private sector 
2 ,iW assumed to depend upon observable 
characteristics ( , )i jiX S  and some unobservable factors 1 2( , ).i iε ε  (2.9b) gives an expression 
for the latent reservation wage RiW , that depends on variables 
R
iZ  excluded from the earnings 
equations (2.9i), in addition to the characteristics ( , )i jiX S . Equations (2.9c)-(2.9e) specify the 
selection rules. The latent sectoral preferences (2.9c) are dependent on the wage gap between 
the offered wage rates in public and private sector 1 2( , )i iW W  and the reservation wage 
R
iW  
and the non-pecuniary benefits related to each option 1 2( , , ).Ri i iZ Z Z  It is assumed that the 
observable characteristics ( , , )li i jiZ X S  and the unobservables 
1 2( , , )RDi Di Diε ε ε  affecting the 
decision variables are additively separable. (2.9d)-(2.9e) are choice indicators. The actual 
sector-dependent wages are given by (2.9f), with the observed wage rate iW  being equal to the 
offered wage rate liW  if sector l is chosen. (2.9g) defines observed earnings iY  as the product 
of observed wage rate iW  and observed working hours iH  for an individual i, assuming that 
the individual can only hold a single job at a wage rate invariant to hours worked. The 
equations (2.9i) states that the sector-specific log-earnings are given by the earnings relation 
(2.7) only if the individual accepts the wage offer. For non-participants the observed hours of 
work iH  and the observed labour market earnings iY  are both zero, as given in (2.9j).  
 
 ( , , ),li l i ji liW f X S ε=           { }for 1, 2 ,l =                (2.9a) 
            ( , , , ),R Ri R i i ji RiW f Z X S ε=                                                     (2.9b) 
 ( ) { }* 1,2, 1,2, 1 2, ( , , , , ) ,   for 1,2, ,l k R k R R li l i i l i i i i ji DiD m W Z g Z Z Z X S l Rε= == = + =              (2.9c)
 iD k=     if * 1 2(1,2, ),max ( , , , , )k l k Ri l R l k i Di k i i i i jiD g Z Z Z X Sε ε= ≠≡ − <         (2.9d) 
 1liD =    if ,iD l=    { }for 1, 2, ,l R=                                    (2.9e) 
 li iW W=       if { }1,     for 1, 2 ,liD l= =                                                      (2.9f) 
 ,i i iY W H≡ ⋅                              (2.9g) 
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 1
2
log ( ) ( )
J
l l l l
i i i i j i ji i
j
y W H m X X Sβ ω
=
⎡ ⎤= ⋅ = + +⎣ ⎦ ∑ %      if { }1,     for 1, 2 ,liD l= =       (2.9h)  
 0i iY H= =       if 1,RiD =              (2.9i) 
where 
 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ,
l l l l l
j i j i j i j jX m X m X b bβ − −= − + −  
 ( ){ }1 1 1
2
,
J
l l l l l l l l
i ji j i j j ji i i i
j
b b b b S bω ν υ− −
=
= − − − + + +∑ %          { }for 1, 2 .l =  
 
This system of equations is motivated by a reservation-wage model, predicting that the 
individual chooses to work only if offered earnings are greater than some lowest acceptable 
wage level (a reservation wage), and chooses not to work otherwise. The sector choices are 
based on valuation of various non-pecuniary benefits and the wage gaps. Similar selection 
problems arise in estimation of wage differentials, as wages are observed only for those who 
work. The above problem is posed without explicitly specifying the relation between earnings 
and wages or counterfactual sector-specific wages, such that only equations (2.9a)-(2.9e) are 
of interest. We specify (2.9h) in terms of earnings, as these relationships follow from the 
human capital theory of lifetime earnings maximization. However, in the returns to schooling 
literature there is an ambiguity as to what constitutes a proper measure of the dependent 
variable (Willis, 1986) and a number of studies report returns to schooling both on hourly 
wages and monthly/annual earnings. This has obvious implications for interpretation of the 
returns to schooling parameters.28 
   
We are interested in estimating the sector-specific earnings relation (2.9h), especially 
computing the average private returns to schooling ( ).lj iXβ  An OLS fit on (2.9h) would suffer 
from a large number of problems. Apart from the biases arising through a likely correlation 
between jiS%  and the composite error terms liω , i.e. the ability bias due to correlation between 
                                                 
28 By assuming exogenously fixed labour supply we have simplified matters. Log(earnings) can normally be decomposed 
into log(wages) + log(hours worked). Unless workers decide on wages and working hours simultaneously, the effect of 
schooling on log(earnings) could be similarly decomposed into a wage (or marginal productivity) component and an hours 
of work component. However, simultaneity in the choice of working hours and wage rates is likely, as suggested by 
Moffitt (1984), Tummers and Woittiez (1991), and Vella (1993). Perhaps distinguishing between potential and actual hours 
of worker in the above model could provide a solution to this problem. Hardoy and Schøne (2006) allow choice of part-
time and full-time employment in a switching regression model with endogenous switching for Norwegian data. They find 
“no evidence of systematic selection bias” with small wage gaps between part-time and full-time workers when using 
capital income as an instrument for choice of employment interval. However, to our knowledge there is no satisfactory 
solution to this problem in the empirical literature when we allow for multiple sources of selection. 
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l
iν  and ,jiS%  the returns bias due to correlation between ljib  and ,jiS%  and the measurement 
error bias due to correlation between liυ  and ,jiS%  there would be an additional participation 
bias when there is correlation between any of the random terms in the composite errors liω  
and the unobserved determinates of sector choice .lDiε  To see this, we take the conditional 
expectations of (2.9h), given observable characteristics, schooling and sector choices, such 
that 
{ }1
2
| , , 1 ( ) ( ) | , , 1  for 1, 2 .
J
l l l l l
i i ji i i j i ji i i ji i
j
E y X S D m X X S E X S D lβ ω
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = + + = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑% % %    
By expanding the composite errors liω  according to (2.7) and inserting the decision rules 
(2.9d), we can express the last terms as  
( ) { }1 21 1
2
( , , , , ), , 0  for 1,2 .
J
l l l l l l R
ji j i ji i i i i l i i i i ji i ji
j
E b b S b g Z Z Z X S X S lν υ ε−
=
⎡ ⎤− + + + < ≠ =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ % %  
In general, this conditional truncated mean would be non-zero, irrespective of various 
correlations between jiS%  and .liω  Without restricting the joint distribution of random terms 
( , , , )l l l lji i i ib ν υ ε  with (1,..., )j J=  over each sector l, the conditional mean of the errors terms 
cannot be given a specific functional form. Nor is it easy to make qualitative predictions on 
the direction of the selection bias. In a simple selection model with exogenous schooling 
assignment, no heterogeneity in returns and a binary choice between labour force participation 
and staying unemployed, the error terms in the earnings or wage equation and the 
participation equation are often assumed to follow a joint normal distribution. This yields a 
closed form for the conditional means. A discussion on the multinomial logit model with 
general selection is given in McFadden (1980) and Lee (1983).  
2.3.5 Estimation methods 
This section compares two non-experimental estimation methods, namely control function 
and instrumental variables, which have been commonly used in response to the selection 
problems discussed earlier.29 The focus here is on the methodological distinctions between the 
estimation methods, especially the identifying assumptions and their validity in different 
contexts. We focus exclusively on the selection problem, abstracting from biases related to 
misspecification and measurement errors.  
                                                 
29 Comprehensive surveys of various non-experimental estimation methods are provided by Blundell et al (2005), Card 
(1999), and Heckman and Navarro-Lozeno (2004).       
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Instrumental variables 
 
Instrumental variables (IV) techniques are applied in situations where there are reasons to 
believe that there is a correlation between observable schooling measures and the 
unobservables in the earnings equation (2.6). IV methods seek to establish exogenous 
variation in schooling measures and identify the parameters of interest using this variation. In 
order for this to be possible, such variables must be correlated with the true measure of 
schooling and uncorrelated with the unobservables in the wage equation. For simplicity, we 
restrict the schooling coefficients to be the same across different schooling levels in (2.6) such 
that 1( ) ( ) ( ),j i j i im X m X b X−− =  [ ]1 0, ,ji j i i ib b b b E b−− = =  and 2 ,J ji ij S s= =∑ %  so that  
 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ,
i
i i i i i i i i i
e
y m X b X s b s b b s υ ν= + + + − + +14424443                (2.10)  
where ie  is the composite residual. An IV iZ  would satisfy the conditions , 0i i iE Z Xν⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  
and , 0.i i iE Z Xυ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  By taking the conditional expectation of (2.10) we get the following: 
  ( )1 0 0, ( ) ( ) , ( ) ,i i i i i i i i i i i iE y Z X m X b X b E S Z X E b b S Z X⎡ ⎤ = + + ⎡ ⎤ + ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
The IV method can be applied by replacing the conditional expectation of schooling with its 
prediction in both its linear and interaction terms. Since the last term in the equation above 
contains the interaction between the schooling variable and the unobservable individual 
returns, the IV method would produce inconsistent estimates of the ATE and the TT unless 
stronger assumptions are made. One such assumption is ,0bbi =  implying that given the 
conditioning variables X, the returns are homogeneous across individuals. Following the IV 
assumptions, the last term is zero. In addition, the IV estimator requires a specification of 
1( )im X  and ),( iXb  and would in general be subject to the potential misspecification bias 
associated with OLS. However, in cases where the above assumptions are satisfied and the true 
functional form is known, the IV method provides benchmark estimates that account for 
endogeneity of schooling.30   
 
In general heterogeneous returns models where ,0bbi ≠  the situation is more complicated. An 
important parameter of interest in the literature is the average effect of treatment on the 
treated (ATT). Under some conditions, it is possible to consistently estimate ATT in the 
                                                 
30 In the multi-treatment framework with each schooling level having its level-specific coefficient, at least as many 
instruments are needed as the number of levels in order to identify all the parameters. 
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presence of heterogeneous returns. Assume that we consider two groups: college graduates 
)1( 1 =iS  and high school graduates ).0( 1 =iS  The treated individuals are those who have 
received college education. We assume that the condition [ ] [ ]1,1,, 11 === iiiiiii SXbESXZbE  
is satisfied, implying that conditional on X the instrument Z is not correlated with the 
individual-specific component of the return ib  for those who have received the treatment. 
Thus, the schooling decision is unrelated to the individual gains. Suppose that there is a single 
binary instrument { }.1,0∈iZ  Conditional expectation of (2.7) gives: 
 [ ] [ ]{ } [ ]iiiiiiiiiii XZSESXbEXbXmXZyE ,1,)()(, 110 =++= . 
Under the above condition, the IV estimation of the schooling coefficient provides a consistent 
estimate of the conditional effect of treatment on the treated:  
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However, if there is comparative advantage, the IV estimator will not estimate the ATT. 
Following Imbens and Angrist (1994), there is a literature that aims at interpreting IV 
estimates in such cases. Under some weaker conditions, the IV estimates the local average 
treatment effect (LATE). Angrist and Imbens (1995) expand this approach to the models with 
variable treatment intensity. For now, we may consider the same schooling levels as above. It 
is helpful to introduce four subgroups of individuals: those who attend only high school 
irrespective of the value of the instrument (the 'never takers'), those who always choose to 
acquire college education (the 'always takers') and those who are induced by the instrument to 
change their behaviour, either in a perverse way (the 'defiers') or in line with the instrument 
(the 'compliers'). The last group is made up of individuals who would have chosen to pursue 
college education if the instrument were in place, but not otherwise. It is useful to make the 
restriction that the instrument has the same directional effect on all those whose behaviour it 
changes, such that either one of the two last groups can be excluded (usually the defiers). In 
situations where this monotonicity condition is satisfied, the IV estimator can be interpreted as 
the average returns among those individuals who are induced to change behaviour because of 
a change in the instrument.31 This may also provide some intuition for why the IV estimate 
usually varies depending on the instrument that is used. There may be some systematic 
variation in the returns across different subpopulations that are affected by different 
                                                 
31 In interpreting the IV estimator as LATE, the schooling decision does not need to be unrelated to the individual gains. 
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instruments. Using IV estimates to make predictions for the whole population may not be right 
if the instrument affects the population disproportionately. In addition, as in the homogeneous 
returns model, the credibility of the IV approach hinges on the untestable assumptions 
concerning correlation between the error terms in the outcome equation and the instrument. 
Reflecting over these issues is critical in assessing the validity of IV estimates.    
 
Control function estimation 
 
While the matching method completely excludes selection on unobservables and the IV 
method generally provides the LATE (under the monotonicity condition), there is another 
approach known as control function estimation that aims at recovering the average treatment 
effect (ATE) in the presence of selection on unobservables by placing additional restrictions. 
An explicit modelling of the schooling selection process is usually required. In the multi-
treatment framework of equation (2.6) above, we can assume that an individual i's choice of 
schooling level j is subject to the following binary response model 
 ( ){ }1 , 0ji j i i iS f Z X η= + ≥%  with ,i i iZ Xη ⊥ .  
Conditional on the function jf , the unobservables in the outcome equation (2.6), iν  and jib , 
are assumed to be distributed independently of the schooling variable. This implies that the 
structure placed on the selection process completely removes the problem of endogeneity in 
the schooling measures. Another way of stating this requirement is by the following 
conditions: 
 i i irνη νν ν η ε− = +  
 
j jji j b i b i
b b r ηη ε− = +   with  , ji i b iνη ε ε⊥ .32 
Given the above assumptions, the conditional expectations of the unobservables is given by  
  ( ) , , 1 ( , )i i i ji ji i iE X Z S r K X Zνην ν⎡ ⎤− = =⎣ ⎦% , 
  ( ) , , 1 ( , )
jji j i i ji b ji i i
E b b X Z S r K X Zη⎡ ⎤− = =⎣ ⎦%   for  j = 1,…, J. 
The jiK  terms are the control function that account for the dependence of the unobservables 
determinants of log-earnings on the choice of schooling.33 By taking the conditional 
expectation of (2.7) and inserting the above terms, we get 
                                                 
32 Assuming joint normality between the unobservables in the outcome equation and the assignment equation, as is common 
in the literature, would also lead to similar relations between the error terms. For instance, the two-step estimator of 
Heckman (1979) that is widely applied in self-selection problems is a special case of the above model with bivariate 
normal distribution of the unobservables, no heterogeneity in returns, and a binary selection rule.    
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1 1 1
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| , , ( ) ( ) ,
J J
i i i ji i j i ji i j ji ji
j j
E y X Z S m X b X S r K r K Sνην β
= =
⎡ ⎤ = + + + + +⎣ ⎦ ∑ ∑% % %  
where 1 1( ) ( ) ( )j i j i j i j jX m X m X b bβ − −= − + −  is the conditional ATE, 1j jj b br r r rη η νη−≡ − + , and 
the conditional independence condition , , 0i i ji jiE X S Kυ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦%  holds, i.e. no measurement 
errors etc. Replacing jiK  terms with their estimated counterparts, specifying the functional 
forms of ( )j im X  and performing a linear fit on the resulting equation will provide estimates 
of ( )j iXβ  for different schooling levels j. Under common distributional assumptions on the 
unobservables, the functional form of jiK  may alone provide identification. However, without 
excluded 'instruments' Z problems of multicollinearity can arise between the jiK  terms and 
the X covariates in the outcome equation. In practice the estimator is found to perform poorly 
if there are no excluded variables, as shown by Puhani (2000).  
 
This procedure provides some interesting insights. By invoking control function assumptions, 
not only are we able to estimate the ATE in a multi-level model of heterogeneous returns, but 
also other parameters of interest such as the TT or the TNT. Secondly, under the structure that 
is imposed on the selection process, the r-coefficients are informative on the presence and 
direction of the selection process. Selection on unobserved ability ( rνη ) and selection on 
unobserved returns (
jb
r η ) can be tested separately. Such tests can provide some guidance on 
the reliability of the conditional independence assumption in the matching specification. 
However, the control function approach rests on strong exclusion restrictions. The explicit 
modelling of the schooling selection process can be viewed as equivalent to assuming 
knowledge of the exogenous variation in educational choices for each subpopulation. Thus, 
this knowledge enables the researcher to not only locate the LATE, but the ATE for the overall 
population. While the presence of selection can be tested through the estimated r-coefficients, 
the credibility of the underlying full-information criteria placed on the selection process is 
difficult to test. By placing more structure, we are able to predict more. However, the validity 
of this approach rests on the strong assumptions made on the selection process.    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 Unless distributional assumptions are placed on the unobservables, it is not possible to derive a functional form for .jiK  
However, the control functions can usually be written as functions of the participation propensities ),,( iij ZXp  which can 
be easily calculated using a multinomial estimation. In such cases, the control functions can be approximated by 
polynomials in the participation propensities. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Overview 
In this part we estimate the returns to education based on Norwegian wage data for paid 
workers for the year 2001. Section 3.1.2 provides a review of earlier studies on educational 
returns that use similar methods and comparable data. The data sources are described in 
Section 3.1.3. We restrict our attention to the three main problems discussed earlier, namely 
specification, selection and endogeneity. Cross-sectional OLS estimates are given in Section 
3.2. Focusing on the specification issues, we allow for non-linearity in the schooling measure 
and interactions between schooling and experience in Section 3.2.2. Effects of controlling for 
labour market characteristics, such as industry and region, are discussed in Section 3.2.3. All 
wage equations are estimated separately for gender and sector subgroups. Section 3.3 
considers the problems related to endogeneity of schooling and selection bias due to non-
random choices of labour force participation and sector choice. Descriptive statistics, tables 
and estimation results are given in the appendix.  
3.1.2 Earlier studies  
Given the peculiar nature of an institutionalised wage setting and the availability of rich 
register datasets on earnings, there have been a large number of studies analysing earnings 
dispersion in Norway. Apart from descriptive studies on earnings/income inequalities, 
economists have also been concerned with issues relating to bargaining regimes, local labour 
markets (regions and industries), skills returns (education, formal or informal training), 
establishment effects, performance pay, and certainly, gender wage differentials. An updated 
overview of this literature is not available, however, fairly lengthy surveys of studies on 
earnings dispersion and educational pay are given in Dale-Olsen (1997), Barth and Røed 
(1999) and Raaum (1999).  
 
Hægeland, Klette, and Salvanes (1999) and Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2003) are the two 
prominent studies on educational returns in Norway. Both of these studies touch upon 
problems related to endogeneity and selection bias. Hægeland et al compare the estimates of 
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returns to education across different cohorts, sectors and over time and find stability in 
educational returns. Self-selection into education is corrected by using an IV technique. 
County during childhood is used as an identifying instrument for choices of schooling levels. 
It is assumed that the region where a person grew up does not by itself influence earnings 
when conditioning on the level of education and other variables. The educational choice 
equations also include individual’s gender and a number of other family background variables 
as explanatory variables. The earnings equations are estimated only for full-time workers 
(those working more than 30 hours) in 1980 and 1990. The number of children, their age-
composition, and the disposable income of the rest of the household are used as determinants 
of full-time employment to account for selection bias. These variables are excluded from the 
earnings regressions. After correcting for education and employment selection, the results 
indicate non-linear returns across schooling levels, while the returns are stable across cohorts.  
 
Aakvik et al (2003) estimate a comparative advantage model for schooling, in which the 
returns to education vary at different levels of education. Problems relating to endogeneity of 
schooling choices and heterogeneity in the returns to education are discussed. In order to 
correct for endogeneity of schooling in this variable treatment intensity framework, 
instruments need to be specified at each level of education. Aakvik et al pursue an 
experimental IV approach, exploiting the staged implementation of increase in years of 
compulsory education through a major reform in the school system in the 1960s. The reform 
extended the minimum years of schooling from seven to nine years. In particular, the 
researchers look at annual earnings in 1995 across individuals with different schooling levels 
born in the period 1948-57. The earnings equations are estimated only for full-time workers. 
These cohorts were exposed to the reform that took more than ten years to implement. 
Comparisons across schooling levels are possible because the same birth cohorts are observed 
through both types of compulsory school systems, since the reform was implemented in 
different years across municipalities. Also after controlling for selection effects, the results 
indicate non-linearity in returns to education.   
3.1.3 Data sources 
Our primary source is the Wage Statistics for 2001 provided by Statistics Norway.34 This 
comprises a set of cross-sectional micro datasets containing about 1.2 million individuals and 
contains information on both public and private sector employees. The data on public sector 
                                                 
34 Documentation provided in Statistics Norway (2005).  
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employees is taken from administrative registers covering all employed workers. For 
employees in privately registered enterprises, the data is based on an annual stratified random 
sampling of enterprises conducted by Statistics Norway.35 Apart from the primary sector, all 
other industries are represented. The enterprises are characterised as small, medium-sized or 
large, depending on the number of employees.36 For small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
sampling rates vary between 10-20 per cent and 40-50 per cent respectively, while all large 
enterprises are sampled. Within each sampled enterprise, all workers are counted. Depending 
on the worker’s employment industry, between 30 and 90 per cent of private sector employees 
are covered.  
 
The datasets contain information on a number of earnings components such as average 
monthly paid salaries, variable additional allowances, bonuses, commissions, and contracted 
weekly working hours. Our constructed measures of gross average hourly wages are based on 
these variables. See Section 6.1 for detailed variable definitions. In this respect, this dataset is 
unique. Few studies build on detailed information on earnings components and working hours 
for such a large population. The datasets also provide several other measures such as years of 
schooling, educational field, industry, age, sex, and municipality of residence. We remove 
immigrants, students, and individuals having multiple jobs from the sample. Only paid 
workers in the age group 20-64, with contracted working hours between 1 and 75 hours per 
week and an hourly wage between NOK 50 and NOK 2000 are included. Table A.1 provides a 
description of the data selection process.  
3.2 OLS Estimation 
3.2.1 Standard specification 
While other studies on educational returns in Norway use data on annual earnings for full-
time workers, we use wage data for a much larger population covering both part-time and 
full-time employees. Although the theoretical models in Section 2.2 are formulated in terms 
of lifetime earnings and, under the assumptions made clear earlier, can be reduced to the 
annual earnings equation (2.4), there is ambiguity in the empirical literature as to what 
                                                 
35 The variables used for stratification are industry and size of the enterprise. The survey is conducted in September-October 
once every year. Data on monthly earnings is drawn from the sample population and seasonal corrections are made to 
make the data representative for any month. See Grini (2007) for details on the stratification method.   
36 Enterprises having employees under a certain minimum ('cut-off') are excluded from the sample. The cut-off limits used in 
WS97-07 vary between <3 and <5 across different industries and sampling years. Removing the very small enterprises is a 
way of excluding self-employed workers.  
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constitutes a proper measure of the dependent variable. Both returns to education on hourly 
wages and annual earnings are found in the literature. Our simple theoretical framework is 
silent on issues relating to labour supply. One way to circumvent this ambiguity is to impose 
that the agents work full-time once they are employed with a fixed hours of work supply. 
However, the empirical literature on wage differentials based on the Mincer earnings 
equations implicitly assumes that the log-earnings function is additively separable into a log-
working hours component and a log-wages function. The latter is assumed to have exactly the 
same functional form as the log-earnings function. Unless schooling has an effect on choice of 
working hours or that the wage rates depends upon working hours, the returns to education 
can be estimated either on earnings or wage data. We do not disregard that schooling has an 
effect through working hours. However, for simplicity we assume that wages are invariant to 
the choice of working hours. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing endogenous choice 
of working hours. By restricting our attention to the returns to education on hourly wages, we 
may interpret the schooling coefficients as the relative increase in worker productivity. 
Estimates of educational returns from annual earnings data for the subpopulation of full-time 
workers can be given a similar interpretation. However, as working hours are not precisely 
observed in earlier studies and crude measures are used for full-time work, there may be 
considerable measurement errors. Thus, we view the effect of schooling on average hourly 
wages as a better indicator of productivity increase.       
 
We consider the following specification of the empirical wage equation 
2
0 1ln ,i s i i i iw s p pα β γ γ ε= + + + +                               (3.1) 
where iw  is the wage rate for individual i with schooling level s and potential experience p, 
and sβ  is the rate of return to schooling.37 For now, we place the conditional independence 
restriction , 0,i i iE s pε⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  deferring the problems of endogeneity and selection bias to 
Section 3.3. The data is segregated across gender and sectors and the wage equations are 
estimated separately for each group. Table A.11 provides OLS estimates of (3.1). We find that 
the estimates of education returns range between 4.8 and 7.8 percent, and are moderate 
compared to estimates for other countries (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)). There is 
considerable variation in the educational returns between the public and the private sector, 
                                                 
37 Using potential experience as a proxy for post-school human capital investments may be problematic, especially since it 
generally overestimates working experience for females. There is also an upper bound on experience. In addition, 
identification problems may arise when analyzing cohort effects because of perfect co-linearity between birth years, years 
of schooling and potential experience. 
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and between male and female workers employed in private sector. The simple model is 
capable of explaining a strikingly large portion of the wage dispersion in the public sector 
with R-squared values higher than 0.40. This is likely to be an artefact of a rigid and 
centralized wage structure based on education and seniority pay in the public sector. This is in 
contrast to the private sector where we are more likely to find incidence of performance pay 
and a decentralized wage bargaining. Table A.7 also documents higher variance in log-
earnings for private sector industries. When gender and sector dummies are excluded from the 
pooled regression, the R-squared value falls to 0.2467. The schooling coefficient estimates are 
almost unchanged. 
3.2.2 Functional form flexibility 
In this section we relax two simplifying assumptions implicit in the standard specification 
(3.1) above. Firstly, interaction effects between education and experience are allowed. In 
other words, we do not restrict the log-wage experience profiles to be independent of 
schooling levels. Table A.12 reports the results from this estimation. We find significant 
interaction effects between schooling and experience. However, the schooling coefficient can 
no longer be interpreted as the marginal return to education. Figure A.3 shows how the returns 
to education vary with years of experience in different subpopulation. The estimates provide 
evidence for concavity in the returns profile across years of experience for each of the four 
gender-sector groups. However, the interaction effects are relatively small in the public sector. 
In the private sector, returns to education increase to the points where male workers have 20 
years of experience and female workers have 15 years of experience, and fall sharply after 
that. The overall estimates suggest falling returns to education. This finding is in contrast with 
the assumption of parallel experience profiles across schooling levels, implicit in the 
specification (3.1).38  
 
Secondly, we allow non-linear returns across years of schooling. The descriptive statistics 
provided in the appendix highlight some interesting facts in this context. Figure A.1 shows a 
non-linear relationship between years of schooling and average log wages. We observe spikes 
in the wage profile around 14/15, 18, and 20 years of schooling, irrespective of gender or 
sector. Such patterns may indicate differences in schooling returns across educational fields 
and/or irregularly high returns for completed degrees. We explore the possibility of non-linear 
                                                 
38 Heckman et al (2006) also find evidence of converging experience profiles in the US census data for 1970-1990. An 
alternative way of testing this assumption is to estimate the experience profiles separately at each educational level and see 
if the experience profiles are parallel across schooling levels.  
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returns by (i) controlling for educational fields, and by (ii) replacing the continuous schooling 
variable by indicators for educational groups (see Tables A.3 and A.4 for definitions of the 
different categories). Table A.13 reports the estimation results once we have controlled for 
differences in educational fields. 
 
Controlling for educational fields enables us to capture some of the wage dispersion within 
each schooling year, however maintaining linear schooling returns, we assume that the 
systematic non-linearity observed in the earnings-schooling schedule is caused solely by 
differences in the composition of educational fields across schooling years. This procedure 
does not allow us to test whether non-linearity is an intrinsic component of the wage 
schedule.39 By combining educational fields and years of schooling, we construct new 
educational groups that enable us to detect non-linearity easily. We start by specifying the 
non-linear schooling model with dummy regressors for educational groups jeg  
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= + + + +∑                                         (3.2)  
where each of the j educational groups are allowed to have different coefficient. We continue 
to assume that the residual restriction [ | , ] 0i i iE v eg p =  holds. Estimation results are displayed 
in Table A.14. We also consider the case of multilevel interaction effect, allowing each 
educational group to have a group-specific experience profile, such that  
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We estimate equation (3.3) for the whole population, and find significant deviations in the 
cumulative educational returns. We also find significant variation in the group-specific returns 
across years of experience. Estimation results are presented in Table A.15 and Figure A.4. 
3.2.3 Labour market characteristics 
The human capital model assumes that the labour market is competitive, i.e. there are no wage 
rigidities, mobility costs, wage bargaining etc, so that wages equal the marginal productivity 
of labour. This theory does not predict any relationship between wages and employer 
characteristics. By contrast, the empirical evidence shows consistent variation in earnings 
across different industries, occupations, labour market regions, bargaining regimes, and other 
                                                 
39 It is uncertain if variation in educational fields fully explains the three spike-points. Individuals having 14/15 years of 
schooling are highly likely to be enrolled in a vocational college, while those having undergraduate tertiary education are 
evenly distributed across educational fields.  
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firm characteristics. Meanwhile, some alternative theories of wage determination, such as the 
efficiency wage theory and agency theories, suggest that employer characteristics do matter.40 
Therefore, it is a common practise to control for employer and other labour market 
characteristics in wage regressions. However, estimates of returns to education are sensitive to 
inclusion of additional covariates. The interpretation of the schooling coefficient is no longer 
straightforward. Disregarding the wage-productivity relationship embedded in the human 
capital production function (2.3), we may consider the set of options that emerge once an 
individual takes more education, such as the possibility to work in highly paid industries, 
firms, or living in richer neighbourhoods, as a part of the returns to education. If the parameter 
of interest is the composite effect of education on wages, adding covariates that depend on 
education can bias our estimates unless proper corrections are made to handle the endogenous 
character of such variables.   
 
At present, we disregard the problems discussed above and estimate the model (3.2) 
controlling for employer characteristics, with dummies for industry and labour market 
region.41 Table A.16 gives the estimation results. It is likely to believe that individuals having 
different schooling are not randomly distributed across regions or industries. The composition 
of various educational groups is also likely to be different across regions. By adding dummies 
for labour market region and industry, we are able to control for effects of any unmeasured 
characteristics that are constant across individuals within each region-industry subgroup. 
Overlooking the endogeneity of schooling choices, we may interpret the education 
coefficients as the average returns to a given education when the individual is randomly 
assigned to a region-industry subgroup. Without these controls the education coefficients may 
capture the effects of being hired in a high-paid sector or living in a region with higher wages. 
As noted by Pereira and Martins (2004), the estimates for educational returns fall when 
controls for region and industry are added. We also find significant region-industry effects for 
all population groups. When controls for labour market characteristics are added, the model is 
able to explain more of the wage dispersion. The increase in R-squared is especially 
significant for the private sector. This indicates that employer characteristics are relatively 
more important determinants of the wage setting outcomes in the private sector, compared to 
the public sector.  
                                                 
40 See Stiglitz (1986) for a formal overview of efficiency wage theories. Krueger and Summers (1988) provide some 
evidence for inter-industry wage differentials, while Molho (1992) presents a theory of local pay determination, 
considering regional wage differentials.  
41 The data material does not allow estimation of the more general model (3.3) when we add regional and industry dummies.  
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3.3 IV Estimation 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous sections, we have ignored the problems relating to endogeneity of educational 
choices and selection bias arising through non-random participation in the labour market. In 
this section, we restrict our sample to non-immigrants who are currently not enrolled as 
students and are between 23 and 43 years of age in 2001. The primary reason for considering 
this particular age group is the availability of large scale demographic data for parents, such 
as their education, work status, occupation, industry, and housing location during the 
individual’s childhood. Using the decennial National Population and Housing Censuses for 
the period 1960-2001 (see Vassenden (1987) and Statistics Norway (2006)), we are able to 
collect data on a large number of demographic variables, such as the number of children, 
parental characteristics, and marital status, in addition to non-labour earnings for a large 
portion of the population in this age group. An overview of the data selection process for 
merging the census data with the earnings data is given in Table A.2.  
 
We follow two estimation strategies: Selection biases are corrected using the standard 
Heckman two-step and maximum likelihood (ML) procedures, while the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation method is used to handle the endogeneity of schooling. We consider 
both labour market participation and sector choices in a simultaneous ML estimation of the 
wage and participation equations, assuming that error terms follow a joint-normal distribution. 
Finally, we consider sector choices and endogenous schooling together. This is done in a two-
step procedure, where we first estimate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for sector choice and 
impute this in the wage equation. Next, we estimate the wage equations by 2SLS to correct for 
the endogeneity of schooling. Section 3.3.2 provides estimates of the wage equations 
correcting for selection biases, while the presence of both endogenous schooling choices and 
selective sector-participation is considered in Section 3.3.3.  
3.3.2 Selection corrections 
Wages are observed only for those individuals who have a positive labour supply. Individuals 
outside the labour market are supposed to have an offered wage below their reservation wage. 
As schooling has a positive influence on wages, people with little schooling will on average 
have a lower offered wage and are less likely to participate. We observe the wages for only 
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those individuals with little schooling who receive comparatively high wage offers. Thus, the 
OLS estimates of wages on years of schooling will be downward biased.  
 
Heckman (1979) characterizes this as a latent-variable problem. We can illustrate this in the 
following model with categorical educational variables 
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Equation (3.4a) gives the latent log-wage offered to an individual i with education j, 
experience ,p  in a labour market defined by the set of variables '1.X  (3.4b) is the participation 
equation, with the decision to work being influenced by the individual’s education, 
experience, labour market characteristics and a set of variables Z excluded from the wage 
equation (3.4a). We are interested in the wage returns for having a specific education. 
However, wages are observed only for those who work, as expressed in (3.4c). According to 
economic theory, people who are offered a relatively lower wage than what corresponds to 
their education are less likely to work, as their reservation wage is more likely to be higher 
than their offered wage. Thus, the error terms 1u  and 2u  are expected to be positively 
correlated. The error terms are commonly assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution, 
such that 
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Under assumption (3.5), (3.4c) becomes a probit selection equation with the outcome variable 
1iD =  if * 0iD >  and zero otherwise. There are two prominent ways of estimating the model 
(3.4). The standard two-step estimator proposed by Heckman considers the conditional 
expectation of log-wages for those inside the labour market  
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Under the joint normality of the errors terms, the last term can be expressed as 
41
  
42
 
 
21
2 ' '
2 2 20 21 2 20 21 2
212
1 21
2 2 ' '
2 2 20 21 2 20 21 2
2
1 .
1
j ji i i i
j
i i
j ji i i i
j
eg p p X Z
E u D
eg p p X Z
φ α β γ γ δ δ σσ
σ α β γ γ δ δ σ
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎡ = ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−Φ − + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 
The so-called inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in the expression above can be estimated in a probit 
model. In the second step, the estimated IMR ( )ˆ .λ  can be imputed in the wage equation and 
the resulting wage equation  
 ( )21 2 ' ' '121 1 10 11 1 10 2
2 2
ˆln , , , ,i j ji i i i ji i i i i
j
w eg p p X eg p X Z vσα β γ γ δ λσ== + + + + + +∑   (3.6) 
can be estimated for those observations where the wages are observed. This is the Heckman 
two-step method that corrects for selection bias pertaining to non-random labour force 
participation. This characterization of the selection problem is similar to the omitted variable 
problem with IMR being the omitted variable if OLS was used on the sub-sample with 
observed wages. The two-step method is a limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
method, where the second step uses information on the participating individuals only. 
However, a more efficient full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) is also possible. 
Under the assumption (3.5), the likelihood function for the model (3.4) is 
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Some exclusion restrictions are necessary for the selection corrections to be empirically 
tenable (Puhani, 2000). This is because of the almost linearity of the IMR. Therefore, we need 
to find some “instruments” that appear in the participation equation, but are absent from the 
wage equation. If not, there could be collinearity between the explanatory variables in the 
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wage equation and the IMR. Traditionally, the number and age-composition of children have 
been used to identify female labour force participation, as they are likely to affect work status 
but not the offered wages. This is controversial if women spend time outside the labour force 
because of pregnancy and child-care. This would result in lower labour market experience and 
thereby a lower wage offer. However, we neglect this type of child-wage discrimination.    
 
We construct a set of variables indicating the number of children in the age groups 
{ }0,1,...,10,11 15,16 18,18a∈ − − −  for each individual. In addition, we use the annual non-
labour income in the household, i.e. capital income and the non-taxable components. These 
variables are excluded from the wage equations. Apart from the number of children and non-
labour income, the individual’s education, experience, and labour market region are used as 
explanatory variables in the participation equation. Summary measures on the variation in the 
excluded variables between the participating and the non-participating populations are given 
in Table A.8. Especially, we find a significant gap in the share of individuals with a self-
employed father for the employed and the non-participating male populations. Using these 
variables, we estimate probit participation equations. Results are given in Table A.17. We find 
the number of children in different age groups is a particularly strong predictor of labour force 
participation solely for females. Meanwhile, non-labour income has a negative effect for all 
groups. We also find that the likelihood of an individual being a paid-worker reduces 
significantly if the parents were self-employed during the individual's childhood.  
 
The wage equations are estimated using both the simultaneous ML and the two-step Heckman 
procedures. Results are given in Table A.18. We find small differences in the estimated 
coefficients, though the two-step estimates are slightly smaller for all groups and the standard 
errors are smaller for the ML estimates. Selection effects are found to be significant, though 
relatively small. Coefficients of the participation-correcting IMRs are significant. We find the 
OLS estimates to be upward biased for each group. The difference in the cumulative returns is 
usually on the scale of 1-3 percent points. However, there is greater disparity between sub-
sample OLS and ML estimates for males (> 0.01) than females (<0.01), with the positive 
selection bias being large for males. These findings are consistent with the sorting hypothesis 
stating that individuals with higher returns are more likely to enter the labour market. Though, 
the magnitude varies across different educational groups. However, our estimates show the 
correlation between the errors terms (rho) to be negative in each case. This contradicts the 
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view that there is a positive selection bias and is puzzling given the change in the educational 
returns. The residual variation in log-wages (sigma) is estimated to be greater for the male 
population.  
 
Sector choices 
 
Empirical evidence shows that there are persistent wage gaps for observably equal individuals 
across sectors. OLS estimates show that the returns to education are considerably higher in the 
private sector (see Tables A.19 and A.20). However, it is difficult to say if the higher returns 
to education are caused solely by sector-specific attributes (such as working conditions, 
flexible schedules, job-stability, bargaining regimes etc) or differences in the unobserved 
worker skills composition across sectors. It is likely that sector choices are results of 
optimising behaviour by the agents. An individual would choose to work in a sector only if 
the net wage offer and the non-pecuniary benefits are higher than in the outside option, that is 
working in another sector, being unemployed, or self-employment. In order to make causal 
statements on sector-specific wage differentials, we need to have knowledge of the potential 
wages of an individual in each sector. Since potential wages are unobserved for the outside 
option, this problem is paramount to the latent-variable problem considered earlier. The 
wages are observed only for an individual who participates in the labour force and only for 
the sector where he/she is employed.  
 
We consider this problem in the following latent-variable model 
 * 2 '1 1 10 11 1 10 1ln ,
l l
i i i i i iw s p p X uα β γ γ δ= + + + + +    { }for 1, 2 ,l =              (3.7a) 
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Equation (3.7a) is the latent sector wage equation, with (3.7c) indicating that the observed 
wages for an individual are equal to the sector-specific wage offers if the individual chooses 
to work in that sector. As in the previous section, we assume that the error terms 1
lu  and 2
lu  
are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution. Thus we can estimate the sector-
participation equation (3.7b) in a probit model. It is important to note that there is an 
additional set of excluded variables 2Z  in (3.7b), such as parental work status, occupation and 
industry, identifying the individual’s sector choices. Individuals choose between either 
working in a given sector or to follow the outside option, i.e. work in another sector or remain 
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outside the work force. By reducing this polychotomous problem to a binary choice, we 
encounter some efficiency loss. However, this considerable simplifies our analysis. Sector-
specific wage equations are estimated simultaneously with the sector-participation equations 
for both males and females. In order to avoid collinearity problems between the explanatory 
variables and the correction terms, exclusion restrictions on sector choices are needed. For 
this purpose, we exploit the information on parental work status (self-employment or paid-
workers) and combinations of parental occupation and industries during the individual’s 
childhood. As before, the number of children at different age groups and non-labour income 
are also included.  
 
The first-stage probit estimates are given in Table A.17, while Tables A.19 and A.20 provide 
the estimates of the wage equations for different subpopulations. The results suggest some 
interesting patterns. Sector-specific wage differentials persist even after correcting for 
participation effects. For public sector employees the OLS estimates are upward biased. The 
bias is considerably larger for males. These results are consistent with the sorting hypothesis 
with the most able workers entering the labour force, and sorting behaviour being more 
widespread for males. However we find the opposite to be the case in the private sector. For 
most educational groups, the selection-corrected estimates exceed the OLS estimates with a 
few percentage points. The sector-specific IMRs have significant negative coefficients for all 
groups. The correlation parameters are also negative. These results cast doubt on our previous 
conclusions on the existence of positive sorting.           
3.3.3 Endogenous schooling  
Earlier studies on the returns to education in Norway by Hægeland et al (1999) and Aakvik et 
al (2003) focus on the endogeneity of schooling choices. Both studies emphasize non-linear 
returns to education. Hægeland et al consider this in an explicit ordered multinomial probit 
choice model of the years of schooling, while Aakvik et al construct a comparative advantage 
model with sequential choices of seven schooling levels. Both studies utilise instruments to 
find exogenous variation in schooling choices. While the former approach exploits the 
ordered structure on schooling and uses the same set of instruments for every choice of years 
of schooling, the latter requires a valid instrument at each level of schooling. This is done in 
an experimental framework, exploiting the staged implementation of increase in years of 
compulsory education from seven to nine years through a major reform in the school system 
in the 1960s. The estimated returns to education can be given a LATE interpretation (see 
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Section 2.3.5), being the returns “for a person acquiring an extra year of education just 
because of the educational reform and who would have dropped out of education after seven 
years otherwise” (Aakvik et al (2003), p. 28).      
 
Our preliminary estimates suggest significant non-linearity in the wage returns to education 
across gender and sector, also after correcting for participation bias. However, further 
research is needed to uncover the importance of non-linear returns of education on hourly 
wages in presence of endogenous schooling choices. For simplicity, we disregard non-linear 
returns to schooling. Meanwhile, we allow heterogeneous returns to schooling but assume that 
schooling decisions are unrelated to the individual gains. Thus, there is only an ability bias 
and no returns bias. In this case, the IV estimates provide consistent estimates of the ATT (see 
section 2.3.2), as shown by Blundell et al (2005).  
 
We estimate the probit participation equations (3.7b) and calculate the sector-specific IMRs 
.liλ  After inserting liλ  in the wage equations (3.7a) we get  
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However, we may still have an endogeneity problem because of unobservable characteristics, 
for instance worker ability, affecting both wages and schooling choices and thereby creating a 
correlation between the error term liv  and is . In the schooling returns literature, it is common 
to use supply side variables, such as proximity to educational institutions, and family 
background variables such as parental education, income and work status, as IVs for 
schooling. A comprehensive survey of studies based on IV methods is given in Card (1999). 
However, the validity of most IVs used in the empirical literature is questionable. For now, we 
follow the earlier studies and use parental education and county/region where the individual 
grew up (as a proxy for geographic differences in accessibility of schools).  
 
The equations (3.8) are estimated by 2SLS taking into account the endogeneity of schooling. 
Wage equations both with and without sector-specific IMRs are estimated, to see how 
endogeneity and selection interact. Results are given in Tables A.21-A.25. As most previous 
studies based on IV methods, we find that OLS estimates to be significantly downward 
biased. In fact, our IV estimates rise even further when we take into account sector choices. 
These results are puzzling since omitted worker ability, which is likely to correlate positively 
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with schooling, would suggest that more able workers have higher education and thereby 
create an upward bias the OLS estimates. Secondly, while our preliminary selection 
corrections support the positive selection hypothesis, the direction of the selection bias is 
opposite when we consider endogenous schooling. This is the case for all subgroups we 
consider. On average, we find that the OLS estimates have a negative endogeneity bias of 
about 30 percent and a negative selection bias of about 4 percent relative to the selection 
corrected IV estimates.    
 
One reason for the higher IV estimates could be that we are using parental education as an IV 
without controlling directly for family background in the wage equations. Bound and Jaeger 
(1996) suggest that this may enhance the unobserved differences between the characteristics 
of the treatment and comparison groups implicit in the IV approach. This is likely if we can 
expect intergenerational persistence in unobserved earnings potential. If so, the validity of 
parental education as an IV is highly questionable. Griliches (1977) points to measurement 
errors as another source of bias in the OLS estimates. If ability biases are relatively small, then 
some of the disparity in the IV and OLS estimates may reflect downward bias in the OLS 
estimates due to measurement errors in the schooling variable. This can certainly be the case 
for the register data that we use, especially for older cohorts.  
 
Yet another case is that there is some underlying heterogeneity in the returns to education, 
with availability of schools being comparably more important than individual ability in the 
choice of schooling. In that case, the IV estimates based on birthplace or childhood-county are 
most likely to affect the schooling choices of individuals with higher-than-average marginal 
returns to education. With low accessibility of schooling, these individuals would have taken 
relatively low schooling. Thus, the IV estimates may give us the LATE for high-return 
individual who pursue higher education because of a higher accessibility to schools. This may 
give us a positive difference between the IV and OLS estimates. When we include childhood-
region as the only instrument, we do find lower returns to education than the returns we get by 
also including parental education. However, the IV estimates are still higher than the OLS 
estimates. These results may indicate intergenerational persistence in unobserved earnings 
potential, while we cannot rule out the LATE interpretation.           
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4. Conclusion 
In this study we estimate the returns to education on hourly wages in Norway, taking into 
account the endogeneity of schooling and occupational sector selection. Our results show 
significant variation in the estimated returns to education across different population groups, 
with the wage return to an additional year of schooling ranging between 4.8 and 7.8 percent. 
However, we find strong evidence of non-linearity in the returns across different schooling 
levels and education fields for all population groups we consider. Interaction effects between 
education and experience are also present, leading to a rejection of the standard log-linear 
Mincer wage equation.  
 
Selection effects are found to be significant, though of a moderate size. The magnitude (and 
direction) of the selection bias varies across different educational groups. In general the OLS 
estimates are upward biased for the public sector, with the bias being considerably larger for 
males. These results are consistent with the positive sorting hypothesis suggesting that the 
more able workers are more likely to participate in the labour force. However, we find the 
opposite to be the case for private sector workers. These results cast doubt on the existence of 
positive sorting. Sector-specific differences in the returns to education persist even after 
correcting for selection effects. We find significantly higher educational returns in the private 
sector, especially for male workers.           
 
As most previous studies based on IV methods, we find that OLS estimates to be significantly 
downward biased. In fact, our IV estimates rise even further when we take into account sector 
choices. These results are puzzling since omitted worker ability, which is likely to correlate 
positively with schooling such that that more able workers also have higher education, is 
supposed to give an upward bias in the OLS estimates. Secondly, while our preliminary 
selection corrections support the positive selection hypothesis, the direction of the selection 
bias is opposite when we consider endogenous schooling. This is the case for all subgroups 
we consider. On average, we find that the OLS estimates to have a negative endogeneity bias 
of about 30 percent and a negative selection bias of about 4 percent relative to the selection 
corrected IV estimates.    
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6. Appendix 
6.1 Variable definitions 
Basic paid monthly salaries (BPS). This variable captures the actual cash payments from the 
employer to the employee for work rendered, and can be denoted as the regular basic monthly 
earnings in NOK. Taxes, national insurance contributions or other payments deducted by the 
employer are included in this measure. 
 
Variable additional allowances (VAA). This variable includes allowances for inconvenient 
working conditions and work during off-hours, call-out allowance, shift allowance, and other 
irregularities. The measure is a calculated monthly average based on the aggregate allowances 
given to the employee between 1 January and the time of the census. 
 
Bonuses and commissions (BC). This variable includes allowances that are usually not 
connected with specific duties and where the payments occur irregularly with respect to the 
period in which they are earned or to which they apply. Profit sharing, production allowance 
and gratuities figure in this category. The measure is an adjusted monthly average based on 
the aggregate allowances between 1 October of the previous year and the time of the census. 
 
Gross average monthly earnings. This variable adds all the three previous measures (BPS + 
VAA + BC), and provides a measure of the total monthly earnings. By adjusting the aggregate 
additional allowances and bonus measures by a monthly average, we assume that the irregular 
payments are distributed smoothly across the year. Such payments are an intrinsic part of 
many job contracts and should therefore feature in a measure of overall earnings. Meanwhile, 
overtime payment not included as they are directly related to the additional time/effort made 
by the individual worker.   
 
Contracted weekly working hours (H). This variable provides a measure of the average 
number of hours per week for the year or for the last month given in the job contract. Meal 
breaks are excluded, however, no deductions are made for absences due to holiday, illness, 
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leave of absence or the like. Due to overtime hours or other irregularities in the work 
schedule, this measure may not be equal to actual working hours.  
 
Gross hourly wage (W). Using the above measure of gross average monthly earnings and 
contracted weekly working hours, we are able to construct an estimate of gross hourly wages. 
The formula used for this calculation is: (BPS + VAA + BC)/(4.3 x H), when using the average 
number of weeks in a month equal to 4.3.  
 
Average monthly overtime payment. This variable covers the sum of cash compensation for 
work done beyond contractual working hours. Overtime compensation is a calculated average 
per month over the period 1 January to the time of census.  
 
Years of schooling (S). This variable gives the number of academic years of schooling 
corresponding to the individual's highest completed level of education. The information is 
obtained from the register of the Population's Highest Education.  
 
Educational Field (EF). This variable is based on a 6-digit education code from the 
Norwegian Standard Classification of Education (NUS). We use the second digit to identify 
educational field and classify eight study fields, such as humanities, social sciences, technical 
studies etc (see Table A.3). NUS-codes are taken from the National Education Database 
(NUDB). 
 
Educational Group (EG). By combining years of schooling (in discrete levels) and educational 
field, we construct a variable indicating educational group. This is helpful in testing non-
linear returns to schooling across levels and fields. In all, 21 such schooling categories are 
defined (see Table A.4).  
 
Potential Labour Market Experience (E). We use the standard measure of potential 
experience, used since Mincer (1974). Potential experience is calculated as the individual's 
age at the time of census minus the age at school completion (i.e., E = A - S - 7).  
 
Industry (I). This variable is based on the 5-digit Standard Industrial Classification (NACE) 
code given in the Wage Statistics. Public sector employees are employed either in public 
health services, public education, municipal services or central public administration. For 
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private sector workers, the industrial codes are aggregated up to 11 major industries (see 
Table A.5).  
 
Labour Market Region (R). We use the municipality codes provided in the Central Register of 
Establishments and Enterprises for firm's location and identify the local labour market region. 
The regional classification is documented in Bhuller (2008). Table A.6 provides a list of the 
46 local labour market regions used in the analysis. Unlike earlier studies, this regional 
classification is based on worker commutation across municipalities and is not restricted by 
county-level administrative boundaries.  
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table A.1. Sample selection process I, earnings data 
Steps  Number of individuals (N) in 2001 
Gross sample (Wage Statistics, 2001)  1 235 241 
Age group 20-64  1 159 453 
Working hours restricted to 1-75 per week  1 198 173 
Hourly wage between NOK 50 and NOK 2000  1 198 190 
- Multiple jobs 37 387  
- Immigrants 159 274  
- Students 96 025  
- Missing other covariates 127 493  
Net sample  889 048 
 
 
Table A.2. Sample selection process II, population 
Steps  N in 2001 
 Residents (Census, 2001)  4 520 947 
- Immigrants 522 358  
- Students 424 866  
Age group 23-43  1 371 726 
Population of interest  1 040 205 
    Paid workers  880 841 
Earnings data  (Wage Statistics 2001)  433 767 
Net sample  387 017 
    Public sector employees  139 570 
    Private sector employees  147 879 
    Non-participants  99 568 
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Table A.3. Description of educational fields 
Field Description 2nd digit in the NUS-code N in 2001 
1 General programmes 0 268 737 
2 Humanities and arts 1 39 381 
3 Teacher training and pedagogy 2 82 023 
4 Social sciences and law 3 22 353 
5 Business and administration 4 124 008 
6 Natural sciences, vocational and technical subjects 5 187 458 
7 Health, welfare and sport 6 130 217 
8 Transport, communications, safety and security 8 34 871 
 
Table A.4. Description of educational groups  
Group  Description ~ Years of schooling NUS: 1st digit NUS: 2nd digit N in 2001 
1 Lower secondary 9 2 - 163 269 
2 Upper secondary, basic; general subjects 11 3 0-3,7 46 798 
3 Upper secondary, basic; business and administration 11 3 4 44 249 
4 Upper secondary, basic; vocational and technical  11 3 5,8 43 169 
5 Upper secondary, basic; health, welfare and sport 11 3 6 38 358 
6 Upper secondary, final year; general subjects 12 4 0-3,7 64 743 
7 Upper secondary, final year; business and administration 12 4 4 33 903 
8 Upper secondary, final year; vocational and technical 12 4 5,8 97 388 
9 Upper secondary, final year; health, welfare and sports 12 4 6 24 198 
10 Post upper secondary, non-tertiary education, all subjects  13+ 5 0-8 30 896 
11 Tertiary education, undergraduate; arts and pedagogy 16 6 1,2 100 606 
12 Tertiary education, undergraduate; social sc., law or business 16 6 3,4 42 816 
13 Tertiary education, undergraduate; natural sciences 16 6 5 30 297 
14 Tertiary education, undergraduate; health, welfare and sport 16 6 6 58 593 
15 Tertiary education, undergraduate; transport and comm. 16 6 8 8 613 
16 Tertiary education, graduate; arts and pedagogy 18 7 1,2 10 292 
17 Tertiary education, graduate; social science, law or business 18 7 3,4 13 580 
18 Tertiary education, graduate; natural sciences 18 7 5 21 843 
19 Tertiary education, graduate; health and sports 18 7 6 7 911 
20 Tertiary education, graduate; transport and comm.. 18 7 8 3 096 
21 Postgraduate education; all subjects 21+ 8 - 4 430 
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Table A.5. Description of industries 
Industry Description Sector NACE: 2 digits  N in 2001 
1 Oil and gas extraction, mining Private 10 – 14 17 221 
2 Manufacturing Private 15 – 37 116 476 
3 Sewage, electricity and water supply Private 40, 41, 90 3 464 
4 Construction Private 45 32 053 
5 Wholesale and retail trade Private 50 - 52 93 776 
6 Hotels and restaurants Private 55 11 272 
7 Transport, storage and communications  Private 60 - 64 61 362 
8 Finance, real estate, renting and business activities Private 65 - 67, 70 - 74 70 615 
9 Central government Public 75 96 392 
10 Public educational institutions Public 76 74 397 
11 Municipal services Public 77 213 777 
12 Public health services Public 78 62 883 
13 Private educational services Private 80 3 257 
14 Private health and social work activities Private 85 17 616 
15 Recreational and cultural services Private 91 - 93 14 487 
 
Table A.6. Description of regions  
Number Local labour market region Code N in 2001 Number Local labour market region Code N in 2001 
1 Sør-Østfold 11 30 894 24 Sunnfjord (Førde/Florø) 51 9 884 
2 Oslo 12 255 342 25 Sognefjord (Sogndal/Årdal) 52 6 370 
3 Vestfold 13 35 623 26 Nordfjord 53 4 975 
4 Kongsberg 14 6 650 27 Søndre Sunnmøre 54 8 487 
5 Hallingdal 15 3 849 28 Ålesund 55 15 163 
6 Valdres 21 3 358 29 Molde 56 12 099 
7 Gudbrandsdalen 22 5 866 30 Nordmøre 57 4 300 
8 Lillehammer 23 7 619 31 Kristiansund 58 1 098 
9 Gjøvik 24 13 954 32 Trondheim 61 61 458 
10 Hamar 25 17 837 33 Midt-Trøndelag 62 11 888 
11 Kongsvinger 26 10 028 34 Namsos 63 6 407 
12 Elverum 27 7 458 35 Ytre Helgeland 64 5 484 
13 Tynset/Røros 28 4 257 36 Indre Helgeland 65 10 327 
14 Nordvest-Telemark 31 3 876 37 Bodø 71 17 917 
15 Øst-Telemark 32 4 486 38 Narvik 72 5 986 
16 Sør-Telemark 33 25 034 39 Vesterålen 73 5 580 
17 Arendal 34 15 164 40 Lofoten 74 3 727 
18 Kristiansand 35 25 739 41 Harstad 75 6 404 
19 Lister 36 5 596 42 Midt-Troms 76 6 867 
20 Stavanger 41 60 134 43 Tromsø 77 17 562 
21 Haugesund 42 18 886 44 Alta 81 3 933 
22 Sunnhordland 43 9 678 45 Hammerfest 82 4 598 
23 Bergen 44 82 537 46 Vadsø 83 4 669 
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Table A.7. Descriptive statistics for the net sample  
Variables Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
 Total (N = 889 048) Male (N = 412 580) Female (N = 476 468) 
Age  42.77 11.00 20 64 42.52 11.14 20 64 42.99 10.88 20 64
Log-wage 4.99 0.28 3.91 7.56 5.09 0.31 3.91 7.56 4.90 0.21 3.92 7.02
Schooling (years) 13.28 2.74 8 22 13.42 2.75 8 22 13.17 2.73 8 22
Experience (years) 22.49 11.69 0 49 22.10 11.52 0 49 22.82 11.82 0 49
 Public (N = 447 449) Male, Public (N = 136 500) Female, Public (N = 310 949) 
Age  44.20 10.67 20 64 45.02 10.76 20 64 43.83 10.61 20 64
Log-wage 4.94 0.21 4.11 7.31 5.04 0.23 4.11 7.31 4.89 0.18 4.45 6.80
Schooling (years) 13.98 2.91 8 22 14.76 2.97 8 22 13.63 2.82 8 22
Experience (years) 23.22 11.50 0 49 23.26 11.19 0 49 23.20 11.64 0 49
 Private (N = 441 599) Male, Private (N = 276 080) Female, Private (N = 165 519) 
Age  41.33 11.14 20 64 41.29 11.11 20 64 41.40 11.20 20 64
Log-wage 5.03 0.33 3.91 7.56 5.11 0.34 3.91 7.56 4.91 0.26 3.92 7.02
Schooling (years) 12.58 2.36 8 22 12.75 2.37 8 22 12.30 2.30 8 22
Experience (years) 21.74 11.83 0 49 21.53 11.64 0 49 22.10 12.12 0 49
 
Table A.8. Means of excluded variables in participation equations across different subgroups  
 Total Males Females 
Variables Public Private Non-part. Public Private Non-part. Public Private Non-part. 
Children_0 0.1137 0.1037 0.1118 0.1378 0.1278 0.0975 0.1060 0.0679 0.1210 
Children_1 0.1078 0.1142 0.1472 0.1432 0.1337 0.1072 0.0964 0.0851 0.1730 
Children_2 0.1213 0.1254 0.1378 0.1475 0.1386 0.1145 0.1129 0.1058 0.1529 
Children_3 0.1222 0.1245 0.1328 0.1407 0.1342 0.1223 0.1162 0.1100 0.1396 
Children_4 0.1252 0.1268 0.1331 0.1437 0.1356 0.1249 0.1193 0.1138 0.1383 
Children_5 0.1270 0.1294 0.1370 0.1429 0.1374 0.1303 0.1220 0.1174 0.1413 
Children_6 0.1243 0.1259 0.1343 0.1361 0.1307 0.1325 0.1205 0.1187 0.1355 
Children_7 0.1234 0.1240 0.1298 0.1325 0.1268 0.1293 0.1205 0.1200 0.1300 
Children_8 0.1181 0.1214 0.1267 0.1226 0.1219 0.1296 0.1167 0.1206 0.1248 
Children_9 0.1173 0.1184 0.1237 0.1186 0.1176 0.1232 0.1168 0.1196 0.1241 
Children_ 10 0.1162 0.1130 0.1199 0.1109 0.1105 0.1238 0.1179 0.1168 0.1173 
Children_11-15 0.4725 0.4227 0.4593 0.3917 0.3938 0.4786 0.4984 0.4657 0.4468 
Children_16-18 0.1600 0.1271 0.1545 0.1020 0.1056 0.1499 0.1787 0.1591 0.1575 
Children_18 - 0.1240 0.0892 0.1260 0.0482 0.0554 0.0883 0.1483 0.1393 0.1504 
Father_ind Missing 0.0371 0.0367 0.0504 0.0354 0.0367 0.0494 0.0377 0.0368 0.0510 
Father_ind1 0.1046 0.0844 0.1474 0.0805 0.0794 0.2164 0.1123 0.0919 0.1028 
Father_ind2 0.0100 0.0101 0.0097 0.0089 0.0103 0.0084 0.0103 0.0099 0.0106 
Father_ind3 0.2420 0.2834 0.2499 0.2206 0.2904 0.2182 0.2489 0.2730 0.2703 
Father_ind4 0.0162 0.0149 0.0113 0.0166 0.0161 0.0097 0.0161 0.0130 0.0123 
Father_ind5 0.1307 0.1322 0.1362 0.1190 0.1311 0.1327 0.1345 0.1340 0.1384 
Father_ind6 0.1079 0.1284 0.1150 0.1081 0.1261 0.1068 0.1079 0.1319 0.1204 
Father_ind7 0.1138 0.1247 0.1184 0.1108 0.1242 0.1114 0.1147 0.1255 0.1230 
Father_ind8 0.0334 0.0360 0.0288 0.0371 0.0356 0.0248 0.0322 0.0365 0.0313 
Father_ind9 0.2043 0.1491 0.1330 0.2629 0.1502 0.1222 0.1854 0.1476 0.1399 
Mother self-employ. 0.0920 0.0801 0.1191 0.0806 0.0770 0.1699 0.0957 0.0848 0.0864 
Father self-employ. 0.1627 0.1496 0.2151 0.1369 0.1412 0.2876 0.1710 0.1620 0.1684 
Observations 139 570 147 879 99 568 33 935 88 358 39 081 105 635 59 521 60 487 
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Table A.9. Log hourly wages and years of schooling across different subpopulations 
Years  N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
 Total (N = 889 048) Male (N = 420 480) Female (N = 486 450) 
8 17 655 4.85 0.20 3.92 6.47 8 435 4.93 0.22 3.92 6.47 9 220 4.78 0.15 3.96 5.95
9 36 654 4.83 0.19 3.92 7.31 14 002 4.93 0.21 3.97 7.31 22 652 4.77 0.14 3.92 6.05
10 98 201 4.83 0.22 3.92 6.93 44 935 4.90 0.24 3.92 6.93 53 266 4.77 0.18 3.92 6.67
11 110 129 4.89 0.22 3.93 6.93 34 900 5.01 0.26 3.96 6.93 75 229 4.83 0.16 3.93 6.76
12 66 760 4.91 0.23 3.92 7.29 27 166 5.01 0.27 3.92 7.29 39 594 4.85 0.16 3.93 6.68
13 235 754 4.95 0.27 3.91 7.38 138 620 5.03 0.28 3.91 7.38 97 134 4.84 0.20 3.94 7.02
14 54 675 5.10 0.29 3.95 7.36 25 129 5.22 0.33 3.95 7.36 29 546 5.00 0.21 4.02 6.87
15 45 639 5.13 0.28 3.93 7.56 23 686 5.23 0.31 3.93 7.56 21 953 5.03 0.21 3.95 6.86
16 74 273 5.03 0.21 3.92 7.19 21 436 5.15 0.28 3.97 7.19 52 837 4.97 0.15 3.92 6.50
17 87 196 5.10 0.23 3.95 7.15 32 596 5.19 0.29 4.01 7.15 54 600 5.05 0.16 3.95 6.76
18 29 124 5.37 0.32 3.95 7.08 20 702 5.42 0.32 3.95 7.08 8 422 5.23 0.26 4.10 6.73
19 28 040 5.27 0.27 3.99 7.21 17 173 5.33 0.28 3.99 7.21 10 867 5.19 0.22 4.25 6.69
20 2 026 5.45 0.24 4.63 7.05 1 677 5.47 0.24 4.63 7.05 349 5.36 0.20 4.87 6.09
21 2 397 5.43 0.23 4.57 7.26 1 826 5.45 0.23 4.57 7.26 571 5.35 0.20 4.74 6.04
22 525 5.33 0.21 4.51 6.12 297 5.38 0.23 4.93 6.12 228 5.26 0.17 4.51 5.94
 Public (N = 447 449) Male, Public (N = 136 500) Female, Public (N = 310 949) 
8 7 840 4.79 0.14 4.51 6.33 2 001 4.86 0.16 4.51 6.33 5 839 4.76 0.12 4.51 5.58
9 16 594 4.77 0.13 4.48 7.31 3 191 4.85 0.14 4.48 7.31 13 403 4.75 0.12 4.51 6.05
10 32 333 4.76 0.15 4.13 6.75 6 789 4.83 0.18 4.13 6.75 25 544 4.74 0.14 4.45 6.38
11 53 874 4.82 0.14 4.40 6.93 9 087 4.93 0.17 4.40 6.93 44 787 4.80 0.12 4.49 6.21
12 32 373 4.85 0.15 4.45 7.29 6 517 4.92 0.18 4.45 7.29 25 856 4.83 0.13 4.51 6.68
13 80 059 4.84 0.17 4.27 7.29 28 364 4.92 0.19 4.27 7.29 51 695 4.80 0.13 4.45 6.18
14 28 311 4.99 0.17 4.11 6.82 9 608 5.05 0.19 4.11 6.82 18 703 4.96 0.15 4.50 6.14
15 25 668 5.03 0.17 4.48 7.19 10 715 5.09 0.19 4.51 7.19 14 953 4.99 0.14 4.48 6.80
16 56 594 4.97 0.13 4.48 6.20 10 897 5.02 0.15 4.48 6.05 45 697 4.96 0.12 4.51 6.20
17 72 599 5.06 0.13 4.50 6.23 23 723 5.10 0.14 4.50 6.12 48 876 5.03 0.12 4.51 6.23
18 13 817 5.20 0.21 4.37 6.20 8 655 5.24 0.21 4.37 6.20 5 162 5.13 0.18 4.51 6.02
19 23 834 5.25 0.24 4.53 7.21 14 270 5.29 0.25 4.53 7.21 9 564 5.19 0.21 4.53 6.69
20 1 143 5.32 0.13 4.87 6.01  935 5.33 0.13 4.96 6.01 208 5.26 0.11 4.87 5.74
21 1 964 5.41 0.20 4.87 6.77 1 497 5.43 0.20 4.96 6.77 467 5.34 0.18 4.87 6.00
22 446 5.33 0.21 4.93 6.12 251 5.38 0.22 4.93 6.12 195 5.26 0.16 5.03 5.94
 Private (N = 441 599) Male, Private (N = 276 080) Female, Private (N = 165 519) 
8 9 815 4.90 0.23 3.92 6.47 6 434 4.95 0.24 3.92 6.47 3 381 4.81 0.18 3.96 5.95
9 20 060 4.88 0.22 3.92 6.69 10 811 4.95 0.22 3.97 6.69 9 249 4.80 0.17 3.92 6.05
10 65 868 4.87 0.24 3.92 6.93 38 146 4.92 0.25 3.92 6.93 27 722 4.79 0.20 3.92 6.67
11 56 255 4.95 0.25 3.93 6.79 25 813 5.05 0.28 3.96 6.79 30 442 4.87 0.20 3.93 6.76
12 34 387 4.98 0.27 3.92 6.80 20 649 5.04 0.29 3.92 6.80 13 738 4.88 0.21 3.93 6.39
13 155 695 5.01 0.29 3.91 7.38 110 256 5.06 0.30 3.91 7.38 45 439 4.89 0.24 3.94 7.02
14 26 364 5.21 0.35 3.95 7.36 15 521 5.32 0.35 3.95 7.36 10 843 5.05 0.27 4.02 6.87
15 19 971 5.26 0.34 3.93 7.56 12 971 5.34 0.34 3.93 7.56 7 000 5.10 0.29 3.95 6.86
16 17 679 5.20 0.32 3.92 7.19 10 539 5.29 0.31 3.97 7.19 7 140 5.06 0.27 3.92 6.50
17 14 597 5.34 0.40 3.95 7.15 8 873 5.45 0.41 4.01 7.15 5 724 5.17 0.33 3.95 6.76
18 15 307 5.52 0.32 3.95 7.08 12 047 5.56 0.32 3.95 7.08 3 260 5.39 0.29 4.10 6.73
19 4 206 5.41 0.37 3.99 7.08 2 903 5.49 0.37 3.99 7.08 1 303 5.24 0.30 4.25 6.21
20  883 5.62 0.24 4.63 7.05 742 5.64 0.24 4.63 7.05 141 5.52 0.21 4.90 6.09
21 433 5.51 0.30 4.57 7.26 329 5.54 0.31 4.57 7.26 104 5.40 0.25 4.74 6.04
22 79 5.34 0.26 4.51 6.09 46 5.41 0.25 4.96 6.09 33 5.25 0.24 4.51 5.82
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Table A.10. Log hourly wages across different educational groups and subpopulations 
Group  N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
Total (N = 906 930) Male (N = 420 480) Female (N = 486 450) 
1 163 269 4.83 0.21 3.92 7.31 72 188 4.91 0.23 3.92 7.31 91 081 4.77 0.17 3.92 6.67
2 46 798 4.89 0.22 3.93 6.76 11 733 5.05 0.27 3.96 6.76 35 065 4.83 0.17 3.93 6.76
3 44 249 4.89 0.22 3.93 7.29 10 582 5.03 0.27 4.06 7.29 33 667 4.84 0.17 3.93 6.68
4 43 169 4.97 0.25 3.92 6.93 35 889 5.00 0.25 3.92 6.93 7 280 4.84 0.18 3.94 5.96
5 38 358 4.83 0.14 3.95 6.73 1 210 4.91 0.20 4.16 6.73 37 148 4.83 0.14 3.95 6.25
6 64 743 4.95 0.30 3.92 7.02 26 360 5.08 0.35 3.92 6.99 38 383 4.86 0.22 3.95 7.02
7 33 903 4.93 0.27 3.93 7.38 12 467 5.05 0.32 3.93 7.38 21 436 4.85 0.20 3.95 6.77
8 97 388 5.00 0.25 3.91 7.29 85 552 5.02 0.25 3.91 7.29 11 836 4.85 0.20 3.95 6.18
9 24 198 4.81 0.14 3.92 6.96 2 168 4.85 0.20 3.92 6.33 22 030 4.80 0.13 3.94 6.96
10 30 896 5.06 0.29 3.95 7.10 19 282 5.14 0.30 3.95 7.10 11 614 4.92 0.22 4.02 6.28
11 100 606 5.04 0.18 3.95 7.11 31 923 5.10 0.20 4.01 7.11 68 683 5.01 0.15 3.95 6.87
12 42 816 5.20 0.35 3.93 7.56 22 789 5.31 0.37 3.93 7.56 20 027 5.08 0.27 3.95 6.76
13 30 297 5.26 0.30 3.92 7.36 25 458 5.29 0.29 3.95 7.36 4 839 5.11 0.25 3.92 6.48
14 58 593 5.00 0.14 4.00 6.43 6 338 5.04 0.19 4.11 6.30 52 255 5.00 0.13 4.00 6.43
15 8 613 5.13 0.28 4.05 6.88 7 311 5.15 0.29 4.05 6.88 1 302 5.02 0.20 4.26 6.06
16 10 292 5.18 0.17 4.10 7.04 5 443 5.21 0.17 4.10 7.04 4 849 5.15 0.16 4.10 6.31
17 13 580 5.26 0.30 4.21 7.08 7 636 5.34 0.32 4.21 7.08 5 944 5.16 0.23 4.25 6.46
18 21 843 5.40 0.30 4.20 7.08 17 214 5.44 0.30 4.20 7.08 4 629 5.26 0.26 4.20 6.73
19 7 911 5.43 0.30 3.99 7.21 4 671 5.48 0.32 3.99 7.21 3 240 5.36 0.26 4.36 6.69
20 3 096 5.37 0.26 4.33 6.85 2 979 5.37 0.26 4.33 6.85 117 5.25 0.21 4.64 5.84
21 4 430 5.44 0.23 4.51 7.26 3 387 5.46 0.24 4.57 7.26 1 043 5.35 0.20 4.51 6.09
  Public (N = 447 449) Private (N = 441 599) 
1      61 082 4.77 0.14 4.13 7.31 102 187 4.87 0.23 3.92 6.93
2      23 619 4.82 0.14 4.40 6.16 23 179 4.96 0.26 3.93 6.76
3      18 247 4.80 0.13 4.48 7.29 26 002 4.94 0.25 3.93 6.84
4      12 375 4.90 0.18 4.48 6.93 30 794 5.01 0.27 3.92 6.67
5      31 083 4.84 0.13 4.51 6.12 7 275 4.83 0.20 3.95 6.73
6      25 412 4.86 0.19 4.46 6.19 39 331 5.01 0.34 3.92 7.02
7      9 859 4.81 0.15 4.46 6.75 24 044 4.98 0.29 3.93 7.38
8      20 361 4.88 0.17 4.45 7.29 77 027 5.03 0.26 3.91 7.11
9      20 663 4.81 0.12 4.45 6.15 3 535 4.82 0.23 3.92 6.96
10      11 295 4.93 0.18 4.27 6.14 19 601 5.13 0.31 3.95 7.10
11      86 746 5.03 0.14 4.50 6.80 13 860 5.09 0.32 3.95 7.11
12      17 020 5.02 0.18 4.48 6.05 25 796 5.32 0.38 3.93 7.56
13      9 654 5.06 0.16 4.11 7.19 20 643 5.36 0.30 3.92 7.36
14      53 489 5.00 0.12 4.51 6.23 5 104 5.09 0.25 4.00 6.43
15      6 008 5.08 0.22 4.51 6.82 2 605 5.26 0.36 4.05 6.88
16      9 141 5.18 0.14 4.53 6.31 1 151 5.21 0.32 4.10 7.04
17      10 121 5.18 0.22 4.37 6.17 3 459 5.50 0.37 4.21 7.08
18      8 608 5.20 0.16 4.51 6.20 13 235 5.53 0.30 4.20 7.08
19      6 989 5.42 0.30 4.51 7.21  922 5.50 0.33 3.99 6.78
20      2 559 5.31 0.17 4.64 6.21 537 5.65 0.38 4.33 6.85
21          3 118 5.37 0.19 4.87 6.77 1 312 5.59 0.27 4.51 7.26
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Table A.1. Cross sectional returns to schooling across gender and sector 
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Table A.2. Cross sectional age profiles across gender and sector  
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Table A.3. Cross sectional experience profiles across gender and sector  
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6.3 Estimation results 
Table A.11. Wage equations across gender and sectors 
 Total Male, Public Female, Public Male, Private Female, Private 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 3.8502 (0.0017) 4.1106 (0.0031) 4.0936 (0.0017) 3.7818 (0.0037) 3.8932 (0.0043) 
Education 0.0583 (0.0001) 0.0493 (0.0002) 0.0483 (0.0001) 0.0781 (0.0002) 0.0636 (0.0003) 
Experience 0.0171 (0.0001) 0.0142 (0.0002) 0.0092 (0.0001) 0.0260 (0.0002) 0.0191 (0.0002) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0241 (0.0002) -0.0191 (0.0004) -0.0105 (0.0002) -0.0381 (0.0004) -0.0294 (0.0004) 
Male 0.1282 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Private 0.1465 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
R2 0.4006 0.4145 0.4748 0.3235 0.2677 
Observations 889 048 136 500 310 949 276 080 165 519 
When gender and sector dummies are removed from the OLS regression on the full sample, the R-squared falls to 0.2467.  
 
Table A.12. Wage equations with interaction effects 
 Total Male, Public Female, Public Male, Private Female, Private 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 3.7314 (0.0046) 4.1188 (0.0107) 4.0886 (0.0054) 3.9862 (0.0105) 3.8879 (0.0106) 
Education 0.0651 (0.0003) 0.0478 (0.0007) 0.0477 (0.0004) 0.0611 (0.0008) 0.0615 (0.0008) 
Experience 0.0172 (0.0004) 0.0058 (0.0009) 0.0039 (0.0004) -0.0061 (0.0010) 0.0031 (0.0010) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0071 (0.0008) 0.0080 (0.0018) 0.0081 (0.0008) 0.0423 (0.0020) 0.0308 (0.0020) 
Edu x Exp / 100 0.0229 (0.0029) 0.0708 (0.0060) 0.0507 (0.0030) 0.2706 (0.0075) 0.1644 (0.0077) 
Edu x Exp2 / 100 -0.0019 (0.0001) -0.0022 (0.0001) -0.0017 (0.0001) -0.0069 (0.0002) -0.0059 (0.0002) 
Male 0.1477 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Private 0.1305 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
R2  0.4050 0.4177 0.4778 0.3288 0.2790 
Observations 889 048 136 500 310 949 276 080 165 519 
 
Table A.13. Wage equations with interaction effects and controls for educational fields 
 Total Male, Public Female, Public Male, Private Female, Private 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 3.6768 (0.0049) 4.1073 (0.0108) 4.0817 (0.0059) 3.8497 (0.0110) 3.8014 (0.0113) 
Education 0.0709 (0.0003) 0.0537 (0.0007) 0.0486 (0.0004) 0.0694 (0.0008) 0.0662 (0.0008) 
Experience 0.0160 (0.0004) 0.0101 (0.0009) 0.0037 (0.0004) -0.0086 (0.0010)   0.0017* (0.0010) 
Exp2 /100 -0.0057 (0.0008) -0.0047 (0.0017) 0.0080 (0.0008) 0.0449 (0.0020) 0.0317 (0.0020) 
Edu x Exp /100  0.0324 (0.0029) 0.0463 (0.0058) 0.0532 (0.0030) 0.2925 (0.0074) 0.1739 (0.0076) 
Edu x Exp2 /100 -0.0020 (0.0001) -0.0013 (0.0001) -0.0017 (0.0001) -0.0071 (0.0002) -0.0058  (0.0002) 
Male 0.1276 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Private 0.1414 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Fields Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.4136 0.4609 0.4844 0.3448 0.2981 
Observations 889 048 136 500 310 949 276 080 165 519 
* Insignificant at 0.05 significance level.   
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Table A.14. Wage equations with non-linear returns to education 
 Total Male, Public Female, Public Male, Private Female, Private 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.4692 (0.0010) 4.6117 (0.0022) 4.6160 (0.0010) 4.6101 (0.0021) 4.5591 (0.0022) 
EG21 0.6191 (0.0032) 0.5688 (0.0038) 0.5787 (0.0045) 0.7107 (0.0086) 0.7195 (0.0137) 
EG20 0.5402 (0.0039) 0.4966 (0.0037) 0.4937 (0.0125) 0.7296 (0.0121) 0.6466 (0.0586) 
EG19 0.6710 (0.0025) 0.6565 (0.0030) 0.6316 (0.0025) 0.6351 (0.0136) 0.6539 (0.0098) 
EG18 0.5574 (0.0015) 0.3952 (0.0026) 0.4141 (0.0027) 0.6674 (0.0029) 0.6803 (0.0047) 
EG17 0.5079 (0.0019) 0.4347 (0.0028) 0.4167 (0.0019) 0.6895 (0.0058) 0.6070 (0.0067) 
EG16 0.4047 (0.0022) 0.3592 (0.0029) 0.4141 (0.0020) 0.3225 (0.0109) 0.3994 (0.0099) 
EG15 0.3706 (0.0024) 0.3548 (0.0029) 0.3126 (0.0041) 0.4246 (0.0059) 0.3098 (0.0120) 
EG14 0.3113 (0.0011) 0.2203 (0.0028) 0.2686 (0.0008) 0.2853 (0.0089) 0.2786 (0.0036) 
EG13 0.3856 (0.0013) 0.2520 (0.0025) 0.2654 (0.0027) 0.4514 (0.0024) 0.4684 (0.0045) 
EG12 0.3932 (0.0012) 0.2658 (0.0025) 0.2565 (0.0014) 0.5177 (0.0025) 0.4285 (0.0025) 
EG11 0.3005 (0.0009) 0.2536 (0.0018) 0.2758 (0.0008) 0.2779 (0.0038) 0.2562 (0.0027) 
EG10 0.2072 (0.0013) 0.1735 (0.0027) 0.1085 (0.0018) 0.2683 (0.0026) 0.2030 (0.0030) 
EG9 0.1227 (0.0015) 0.0802 (0.0050) 0.0788 (0.0011) 0.0946 (0.0092) 0.0840 (0.0045) 
EG8 0.1089 (0.0009) 0.0768 (0.0020) 0.0535 (0.0020) 0.1362 (0.0016) 0.1359 (0.0028) 
EG7 0.1241 (0.0013) 0.0821 (0.0039) 0.0613 (0.0016) 0.1827 (0.0029) 0.1299 (0.0022) 
EG6 0.1596 (0.0010) 0.1662 (0.0025) 0.1005 (0.0011) 0.2300 (0.0023) 0.1411 (0.0019) 
EG5 0.0940 (0.0012) 0.0436 (0.0061) 0.0810 (0.0009) 0.0726 (0.0135) 0.0103 (0.0029) 
EG4 0.0639 (0.0012) 0.0730 (0.0023) 0.0307 (0.0024) 0.0653 (0.0020) 0.0680 (0.0035) 
EG3 0.0548 (0.0011) 0.0496 (0.0040) 0.0291 (0.0011) 0.0836 (0.0032) 0.0611 (0.0020) 
EG2 0.0612 (0.0011) 0.0689 (0.0034) 0.0382 (0.0011) 0.1002 (0.0032) 0.0488 (0.0022) 
Experience 0.0176 (0.0001) 0.0159 (0.0002) 0.0094 (0.0001) 0.0265 (0.0002) 0.0199 (0.0002) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0281 (0.0002) -0.0239 (0.0004) -0.0142 (0.0002) -0.0438 (0.0004) -0.0339 (0.0004) 
Male 0.1338 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Private 0.1245 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
R2  0.4265 0.4851 0.5033 0.3529 0.3115 
Observations 889 048 136 500 310 949 276 080 165 519 
The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-EG21 are the cumulative returns relative to EG1. 
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+ The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-21 are the cumulative returns relative to EG1. 
* Insignificant for significance level 0.10.  
** Insignificant for significance level 0.05. 
*** Insignificant for significance level 0.01. 
 
Table A.4. Cumulative returns for different educational groups 
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Estimation results are given in Table A.15. Returns profiles are drawn only for educational groups having significant estimates. 
 
 
Table A.15. Wage equation with non-linearity and multilevel interaction 
         
Variable Coefficient SE   Variable Coefficient SE   Variable Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.4904 (0.0021)       
EG21 0.5897 (0.0150)   EG21 x Exp.     0.0034** (0.0017)   EG21 x Exp2 / 100    -0.0079** (0.0041) 
EG20 0.5723 (0.0228)   EG20 x Exp.  -0.0015* (0.0024)   EG20 x Exp2 / 100   -0.0007* (0.0060) 
EG19 0.6593 (0.0083)   EG19 x Exp. 0.0029 (0.0010)   EG19 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0095 (0.0025) 
EG18 0.4295 (0.0051)   EG18 x Exp. 0.0167 (0.0006)   EG18 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0401 (0.0015) 
EG17 0.4194 (0.0063)   EG17 x Exp. 0.0077 (0.0008)   EG17 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0105 (0.0021) 
EG16 0.3538 (0.0086)   EG16 x Exp. 0.0025 (0.0009)   EG16 x Exp2 / 100  -0.0004* (0.0023) 
EG15 0.3156 (0.0067)   EG15 x Exp. 0.0025 (0.0009)   EG15 x Exp2 / 100 0.0108 (0.0026) 
EG14 0.3818 (0.0035)   EG14 x Exp. -0.0057 (0.0004)   EG14 x Exp2 / 100 0.0075 (0.0008) 
EG13 0.2944 (0.0048)   EG13 x Exp. 0.0113 (0.0005)   EG13 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0261 (0.0011) 
EG12 0.3170 (0.0040)   EG12 x Exp. 0.0107 (0.0004)   EG12 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0276 (0.0011) 
EG11 0.2993 (0.0031)   EG11 x Exp.  -0.0004* (0.0003)   EG11 x Exp2 / 100 0.0019 (0.0007) 
EG10 0.1247 (0.0055)   EG10 x Exp. 0.0067 (0.0005)   EG10 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0107 (0.0012) 
EG9 0.1726 (0.0039)   EG9 x Exp. -0.0044 (0.0005)   EG9 x Exp2 / 100 0.0057 (0.0011) 
EG8 0.1056 (0.0031)   EG8 x Exp.         0.0007*** (0.0003)   EG8 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0022 (0.0007) 
EG7 0.0480 (0.0044)   EG7 x Exp.  0.0061 (0.0005)   EG7 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0077 (0.0011) 
EG6 0.0707 (0.0030)   EG6 x Exp.  0.0077 (0.0003)   EG6 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0114 (0.0007) 
EG5 0.1925 (0.0072)   EG5 x Exp. -0.0059 (0.0006)   EG5 x Exp2 / 100 0.0075 (0.0011) 
EG4 -0.0172 (0.0061)   EG4 x Exp.  0.0054 (0.0005)   EG4 x Exp2 / 100 -0.0076 (0.0010) 
EG3 0.0883 (0.0086)   EG3 x Exp. -0.0016 (0.0006)   EG3 x Exp2 / 100     0.0018** (0.0011) 
EG2 0.0518 (0.0145)   EG2 x Exp.   -0.0014* (0.0009)   EG2 x Exp2 / 100 0.0048 (0.0014) 
Exp. 0.0156 (0.0002)       
Exp2 / 100 -0.0244 (0.0003)       
Private 0.1341 (0.0005)       
Male 0.1230 (0.0005)       
R-squared  0.4319        
Observations 889 047        
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Table A.16. Wage equations with non-linearity and controls for industry and region 
 Total Male, Public Female, Public Male, Private Female, Private 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.5280 (0.0011) 4.5883 (0.0023) 4.6340 (0.0011) 4.6240 (0.0038) 4.6368 (0.0033) 
EG21 0.5709 (0.0031) 0.5159 (0.0037) 0.5341 (0.0044) 0.6354 (0.0081) 0.6292 (0.0130) 
EG20 0.5152 (0.0037) 0.4448 (0.0037) 0.4450 (0.0121) 0.6859 (0.0114) 0.5986 (0.0553) 
EG19 0.6534 (0.0024) 0.6257 (0.0030) 0.6052 (0.0024) 0.6972 (0.0129) 0.6502 (0.0093) 
EG18 0.4879 (0.0015) 0.3607 (0.0026) 0.3620 (0.0027) 0.5766 (0.0028) 0.5687 (0.0045) 
EG17 0.4604 (0.0019) 0.3929 (0.0027) 0.3725 (0.0019) 0.6152 (0.0056) 0.5249 (0.0064) 
EG16 0.3624 (0.0021) 0.3171 (0.0029) 0.3415 (0.0020) 0.3498 (0.0104) 0.3671 (0.0094) 
EG15 0.3415 (0.0023) 0.3071 (0.0029) 0.2658 (0.0040) 0.3853 (0.0056) 0.2581 (0.0114) 
EG14 0.2996 (0.0011) 0.2073 (0.0028) 0.2566 (0.0009) 0.3349 (0.0086) 0.3022 (0.0036) 
EG13 0.3478 (0.0013) 0.2363 (0.0024) 0.2294 (0.0027) 0.4061 (0.0022) 0.4003 (0.0043) 
EG12 0.3562 (0.0011) 0.2438 (0.0025) 0.2273 (0.0014) 0.4702 (0.0024) 0.3670 (0.0024) 
EG11 0.2581 (0.0011) 0.2191 (0.0022) 0.2043 (0.0010) 0.2744 (0.0036) 0.2350 (0.0027) 
EG10 0.1812 (0.0013) 0.1492 (0.0026) 0.0899 (0.0017) 0.2386 (0.0025) 0.1607 (0.0029) 
EG9 0.1260 (0.0014) 0.0739 (0.0049) 0.0805 (0.0011) 0.1173 (0.0086) 0.0934 (0.0043) 
EG8 0.1005 (0.0009) 0.0689 (0.0020) 0.0453 (0.0019) 0.1297 (0.0015) 0.1243 (0.0027) 
EG7 0.1107 (0.0012) 0.0707 (0.0038) 0.0476 (0.0015) 0.1649 (0.0028) 0.1118 (0.0021) 
EG6 0.1432 (0.0010) 0.1407 (0.0025) 0.0848 (0.0011) 0.2077 (0.0022) 0.1164 (0.0018) 
EG5 0.1008 (0.0012) 0.0504 (0.0060) 0.0838 (0.0009) 0.0904 (0.0127) 0.0286 (0.0027) 
EG4 0.0583 (0.0011) 0.0608 (0.0022) 0.0234 (0.0023) 0.0631 (0.0019) 0.0583 (0.0033) 
EG3 0.0472 (0.0011) 0.0435 (0.0039) 0.0226 (0.0011) 0.0824 (0.0030) 0.0485 (0.0019) 
EG2 0.0566 (0.0011) 0.0597 (0.0033) 0.0335 (0.0010) 0.0939 (0.0030) 0.0421 (0.0021) 
Experience 0.0168 (0.0001) 0.0165 (0.0002) 0.0091 (0.0001) 0.0253 (0.0002) 0.0182 (0.0002) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0268 (0.0002) -0.0248 (0.0004) -0.0141 (0.0002) -0.0415 (0.0004) -0.0311 (0.0004) 
Male 0.1168 (0.0005) -  -  -  -  
Regions Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industries Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2  0.4816 0.5179 0.5339 0.4305 0.3871 
Observations 889 048 136 500 310 949 276 080 165 519 
The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-EG21 are the cumulative returns relative to EG1. 
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Table A.17. Probit estimates for labour force participation and sector choice 
 Total Public, Females Private, Females Public, Males Private, Males 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept -3.0632 (0.0790) -5.4559 (0.1114) 0.5975 (0.0728) -5.8070 (0.1306) 0.5702 (0.0793) 
Non-lab. inc. -0.1260 (0.0006) -0.0708 (0.0007) -0.0688 (0.0008) -0.0612 (0.0017) -0.1240 (0.0013) 
Children_0 -0.2989 (0.0086) -0.0992 (0.0110) -0.4626 (0.0123) 0.0115 (0.0130) -0.0193 (0.0113) 
Children_1 -0.3564 (0.0080) -0.2320 (0.0106) -0.3044 (0.0114) 0.0043 (0.0128) -0.0157 (0.0111) 
Children_2 -0.0456 (0.0079) 0.0275 (0.0102) -0.0223 (0.0108) 0.0001 (0.0123) -0.0040 (0.0107) 
Children_3 -0.0612 (0.0078) 0.0378 (0.0098) -0.0626 (0.0103) 0.0053 (0.0122) -0.0298 (0.0106) 
Children_4 -0.1125 (0.0076) -0.0003 (0.0094) -0.1340 (0.0099) 0.0165 (0.0119) -0.0309 (0.0104) 
Children_5 -0.1105 (0.0076) 0.0123 (0.0093) -0.1408 (0.0098) 0.0057 (0.0119) -0.0164 (0.0103) 
Children_6 -0.1049 (0.0076) 0.0125 (0.0094) -0.1188 (0.0098) -0.0008 (0.0120) -0.0275 (0.0104) 
Children_7 -0.0878 (0.0077) 0.0203 (0.0094) -0.1090 (0.0098) 0.0176 (0.0121) -0.0320 (0.0105) 
Children_8 -0.0732 (0.0078) 0.0180 (0.0095) -0.0788 (0.0099) -0.0013 (0.0124) -0.0240 (0.0107) 
Children_9 -0.0582 (0.0079) 0.0233 (0.0095) -0.0793 (0.0099) -0.0021 (0.0126) -0.0007 (0.0109) 
Children_ 10 -0.0486 (0.0080) 0.0514 (0.0096) -0.0778 (0.0100) -0.0196 (0.0130) -0.0078 (0.0112) 
Child. 11-15 0.0049 (0.0046) 0.1161 (0.0055) -0.0795 (0.0058) -0.0148 (0.0074) -0.0066 (0.0064) 
Child. 16-18 0.0269 (0.0075) 0.1405 (0.0085) -0.1140 (0.0089) -0.0016 (0.0131) -0.0039 (0.0112) 
Child. 18 - -0.0725 (0.0079) 0.0257 (0.0086) -0.1520 (0.0090) -0.0489 (0.0164) -0.0139 (0.0137) 
Father_indM -  -0.0886 (0.0290) 0.0001 (0.0306) -0.1018 (0.0371) -0.0687 (0.0330) 
Father_ind1 -  -0.0159 (0.0275) -0.0032 (0.0291) -0.1592 (0.0352) -0.3024 (0.0313) 
Father_ind2 -  -0.0551 (0.0386) 0.0883 (0.0405) -0.1606 (0.0518) 0.0962 (0.0455) 
Father_ind3 -  -0.0815 (0.0255) 0.0773 (0.0270) -0.1431 (0.0319) 0.0870 (0.0289) 
Father_ind5 -  -0.0271 (0.0262) 0.0419 (0.0277) -0.0264 (0.0329) -0.0559 (0.0298) 
Father_ind6 -  -0.1517 (0.0264) 0.1213 (0.0278) -0.1542 (0.0332) 0.0488 (0.0299) 
Father_ind7 -  -0.0906 (0.0263) 0.1024 (0.0278) -0.0873 (0.0331) 0.0083 (0.0299) 
Father_ind8 -  -0.1960 (0.0298) 0.1346 (0.0312) -0.1726 (0.0376) 0.0476 (0.0339) 
Father_ind9 -  -0.0684 (0.0259) 0.0453 (0.0275) 0.0598 (0.0322) -0.1266 (0.0294) 
Mother_self -0.2379 (0.0071) -0.0479 (0.0119) -0.0117 (0.0125) -0.0540 (0.0160) -0.1127 (0.0133) 
Father_self -0.1930 (0.0091) -0.0561 (0.0099) 0.0106 (0.0102) -0.1223 (0.0136) -0.1489 (0.0113) 
Pseudo R2  0.2632 0.2419 0.1585 0.2330 0.1907 
- ln L 162 588 118 219 109 562 63 664 89 932 
Participants 287 449 105 635 59 521 33 935 88 358 
Population 387 017 225 643 225 643 161 374 161 374 
Apart from annual non-labour income and number of children at different age groups, dummies for gender, age, educational group and labour market region were also added to the 
regressions. Non-labour income includes various transfers and capital income and is scaled by 10000. Combinations of industry and occupational codes for both parental are also used. 
Father_self = Father self-employed during the individual’s childhood, Mother_self = Mother self-employed during the individual’s childhood. Cursive coefficient estimates are insignificant 
at a significance level of 0.1.  
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Table A.18. Wage equations with selection correction for employment 
 OLS, Total Two-step, Total MLE, Total MLE, Males MLE, Females 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.7548 (0.0041) 4.7910 (0.0043) 4.7738 (0.0042) 4.6835 (0.0076) 4.6841 (0.0044) 
EG21 0.5660 (0.0056) 0.5335 (0.0058) 0.5489 (0.0057) 0.5655 (0.0081) 0.5655 (0.0082) 
EG20 0.5187 (0.0057) 0.4859 (0.0058) 0.5014 (0.0057) 0.5312 (0.0071) 0.4783 (0.0222) 
EG19 0.6941 (0.0046) 0.6866 (0.0047) 0.6901 (0.0046) 0.7537 (0.0084) 0.6590 (0.0051) 
EG18 0.4967 (0.0027) 0.4669 (0.0029) 0.4811 (0.0028) 0.5005 (0.0042) 0.4737 (0.0039) 
EG17 0.4461 (0.0031) 0.4245 (0.0032) 0.4347 (0.0032) 0.4732 (0.0055) 0.4052 (0.0036) 
EG16 0.3444 (0.0049) 0.3213 (0.0051) 0.3323 (0.0050) 0.3321 (0.0090) 0.3338 (0.0054) 
EG15 0.3364 (0.0035) 0.3057 (0.0037) 0.3202 (0.0036) 0.3559 (0.0049) 0.3093 (0.0070) 
EG14 0.3318 (0.0019) 0.3029 (0.0021) 0.3166 (0.0019) 0.2874 (0.0057) 0.2922 (0.0018) 
EG13 0.3652 (0.0024) 0.3389 (0.0025) 0.3515 (0.0024) 0.3714 (0.0035) 0.3271 (0.0037) 
EG12 0.3687 (0.0019) 0.3453 (0.0021) 0.3564 (0.0020) 0.4211 (0.0034) 0.2974 (0.0022) 
EG11 0.2698 (0.0019) 0.2462 (0.0021) 0.2574 (0.0020) 0.2899 (0.0043) 0.2254 (0.0020) 
EG10 0.1711 (0.0022) 0.1548 (0.0022) 0.1625 (0.0022) 0.1993 (0.0035) 0.1204 (0.0027) 
EG9 0.1374 (0.0024) 0.1140 (0.0025) 0.1251 (0.0024) 0.1106 (0.0089) 0.0992 (0.0022) 
EG8 0.0975 (0.0015) 0.0840 (0.0015) 0.0904 (0.0015) 0.1075 (0.0022) 0.0882 (0.0024) 
EG7 0.1041 (0.0019) 0.0894 (0.0020) 0.0964 (0.0019) 0.1464 (0.0042) 0.0711 (0.0019) 
EG6 0.1405 (0.0016) 0.1318 (0.0016) 0.1360 (0.0016) 0.2012 (0.0031) 0.0941 (0.0017) 
EG5 0.1353 (0.0022) 0.1185 (0.0022) 0.1264 (0.0022) 0.0987 (0.0106) 0.1050 (0.0019) 
EG4 0.0436 (0.0025) 0.0368 (0.0025) 0.0401 (0.0025) 0.0541 (0.0035) 0.0339 (0.0039) 
EG3 0.0564 (0.0025) 0.0439 (0.0026) 0.0498 (0.0025) 0.0768 (0.0066) 0.0419 (0.0023) 
EG2 0.0461 (0.0052) 0.0836 (0.0053) 0.0659 (0.0053) 0.1528 (0.0183) 0.0366 (0.0046) 
Experience 0.0186 (0.0003) 0.0189 (0.0003) 0.0188 (0.0003) 0.0266 (0.0007) 0.0157 (0.0004) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0322 (0.0011) -0.0345 (0.0011) -0.0334 (0.0011) -0.0477 (0.0022) -0.0313 (0.0012) 
Male 0.1359 (0.0009) 0.1350 (0.0009) 0.1355 (0.0009) -  -  
IMR -  -0.0644 (0.0020) -0.0338 (0.0012) -0.0540 (0.0023) -0.0237 (0.0012) 
Rho -  -0.3153  -0.1673 (0.0060) -0.2287 (0.0095) -0.1431 (0.0074) 
Sigma -  0.2042  0.2018 (0.0003) 0.2361 (0.0005) 0.1655 (0.0003) 
R2  0.4653 - - - - 
- ln L - - 108 910 61 032 29 639 
Participants 287 449 287 449 287 449 122 293 165 156 
Population - 387 017 387 017 161 374 225 643 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-EG21 are the cumulative returns relative 
to EG1. 
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Table A.19. Wage equations with selection correction for female sector choices 
      OLS, Public MLE, Public OLS, Private MLE, Private 
Variable        Coefficient SE Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.6528 (0.0028) 4.4707 (0.0033) 4.5467 (0.0079) 4.6261 (0.0087) 
EG21 0.5281 (0.0078) 0.5174 (0.0078) 0.6409 (0.0172) 0.6420 (0.0175) 
EG20 0.4218 (0.0179) 0.4065 (0.0180) 0.6879 (0.0802) 0.7299 (0.0805) 
EG19 0.6350 (0.0042) 0.6240 (0.0043) 0.6437 (0.0178) 0.6957 (0.0180) 
EG18 0.3561 (0.0043) 0.3515 (0.0043) 0.5985 (0.0066) 0.5788 (0.0068) 
EG17 0.3591 (0.0031) 0.3456 (0.0032) 0.5258 (0.0097) 0.5578 (0.0098) 
EG16 0.3003 (0.0044) 0.2874 (0.0045) 0.4031 (0.0179) 0.4455 (0.0180) 
EG15 0.2885 (0.0060) 0.2759 (0.0061) 0.2888 (0.0188) 0.3127 (0.0190) 
EG14 0.2733 (0.0016) 0.2573 (0.0020) 0.3244 (0.0065) 0.3897 (0.0072) 
EG13 0.2313 (0.0042) 0.2274 (0.0042) 0.4203 (0.0064) 0.4021 (0.0065) 
EG12 0.2250 (0.0024) 0.2204 (0.0024) 0.3755 (0.0039) 0.3620 (0.0040) 
EG11 0.2020 (0.0018) 0.1886 (0.0020) 0.2543 (0.0047) 0.2995 (0.0052) 
EG10 0.0855 (0.0030) 0.0837 (0.0030) 0.1550 (0.0047) 0.1431 (0.0048) 
EG9 0.0883 (0.0018) 0.0751 (0.0021) 0.0968 (0.0076) 0.1473 (0.0079) 
EG8 0.0470 (0.0029) 0.0489 (0.0029) 0.1272 (0.0040) 0.1159 (0.0041) 
EG7 0.0464 (0.0022) 0.0457 (0.0022) 0.1066 (0.0032) 0.0867 (0.0033) 
EG6 0.0781 (0.0018) 0.0762 (0.0018) 0.1137 (0.0030) 0.1083 (0.0030) 
EG5 0.1070 (0.0017) 0.0970 (0.0018) 0.0547 (0.0053) 0.0895 (0.0056) 
EG4 0.0175 (0.0045) 0.0177 (0.0045) 0.0559 (0.0068) 0.0510 (0.0069) 
EG3 0.0252 (0.0027) 0.0251 (0.0027) 0.0647 (0.0040) 0.0492 (0.0041) 
EG2 0.0276 (0.0048) 0.0290 (0.0048) 0.0407 (0.0086) 0.0493 (0.0087) 
Experience 0.0122 (0.0003) 0.0124 (0.0003) 0.0289 (0.0008) 0.0274 (0.0008) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0257 (0.0011) -0.0271 (0.0011) -0.0617 (0.0027) -0.0573 (0.0027) 
IMR -  -0.0166 (0.0012) -  -0.0709 (0.0033) 
Rho -  -0.1322 (0.0097) -  -0.2981 (0.0138) 
Sigma -  0.1251 (0.0003) -  0.2196 (0.0001) 
R2 0.4835 - 0.3991 - 
- ln L - 47 859 - 101 363 
Participants 105 635 105 635 59 521 59 521 
Population - 225 643 - 225 643 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-EG21 are the cumulative returns relative 
to EG1. 
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Table A.20. Wage equations with selection correction for male sector choices 
 OLS, Public MLE, Public OLS, Private MLE, Private 
Variable        Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.7000 (0.0069) 4.7680 (0.0088) 4.5955 (0.0090) 4.6230 (0.0092) 
EG21 0.4887 (0.0081) 0.4372 (0.0088) 0.6068 (0.0125) 0.6246 (0.0126) 
EG20 0.4178 (0.0063) 0.3530 (0.0076) 0.6573 (0.0160) 0.7036 (0.0162) 
EG19 0.6498 (0.0067) 0.5922 (0.0077) 0.7246 (0.0296) 0.8039 (0.0298) 
EG18 0.3336 (0.0061) 0.3086 (0.0063) 0.5722 (0.0050) 0.5658 (0.0050) 
EG17 0.3219 (0.0056) 0.2702 (0.0066) 0.6148 (0.0092) 0.6472 (0.0094) 
EG16 0.2530 (0.0076) 0.1902 (0.0087) 0.3337 (0.0207) 0.3811 (0.0208) 
EG15 0.2584 (0.0050) 0.1967 (0.0064) 0.3871 (0.0089) 0.4258 (0.0092) 
EG14 0.1967 (0.0051) 0.1311 (0.0067) 0.3689 (0.0142) 0.4246 (0.0145) 
EG13 0.2399 (0.0054) 0.2183 (0.0055) 0.4232 (0.0041) 0.4146 (0.0042) 
EG12 0.2297 (0.0049) 0.2051 (0.0052) 0.5006 (0.0041) 0.4973 (0.0041) 
EG11 0.2030 (0.0048) 0.1436 (0.0062) 0.3120 (0.0066) 0.3529 (0.0070) 
EG10 0.1062 (0.0052) 0.0861 (0.0054) 0.2334 (0.0041) 0.2280 (0.0041) 
EG9 0.0580 (0.0081)   0.0086* (0.0088) 0.1328 (0.0150) 0.1560 (0.0151) 
EG8 0.0649 (0.0038) 0.0557 (0.0039) 0.1264 (0.0025) 0.1179 (0.0026) 
EG7 0.0707 (0.0073) 0.0627 (0.0073) 0.1715 (0.0048) 0.1662 (0.0049) 
EG6 0.1178 (0.0047) 0.1000 (0.0049) 0.2227 (0.0037) 0.2238 (0.0038) 
EG5 0.0500 (0.0099)   0.0069* (0.0104) 0.1115 (0.0169) 0.1281 (0.0170) 
EG4 0.0274 (0.0058) 0.0204 (0.0059) 0.0663 (0.0041) 0.0614 (0.0041) 
EG3 0.0567 (0.0124) 0.0541 (0.0124) 0.0966 (0.0076) 0.0864 (0.0076) 
EG2 0.0664 (0.0235) 0.0959 (0.0234) 0.0655 (0.0231) 0.1316 (0.0233) 
Experience 0.0178 (0.0008) 0.0187 (0.0008) 0.0329 (0.0009) 0.0329 (0.0009) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0335 (0.0028) -0.0381 (0.0028) -0.0652 (0.0028) -0.0633 (0.0028) 
IMR -  -0.0446 (0.0029) -  -0.0548 (0.0031) 
Rho -  -0.2704 (0.0168) -  -0.2148 (0.0119) 
Sigma -  0.1649 (0.0008) -  0.2552 (0.0007) 
R2 0.4450 - 0.4100 - 
- ln L - 49 703 - 93 410 
Participants 33 935 33 935 88 358  88 358 
Population - 161 374 - 161 374 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. The reference group is lower secondary schooling (EG1). Coefficient estimates for EG2-EG21 are the cumulative returns relative 
to EG1.  
* Insignificant for significance level 0.10.  
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Table A.21. Wage equations with endogenous schooling and selection correction, whole sample 
 OLS Two-step, Selection MLE, Selection 2SLS, Education 2SLS w/ IMR 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept 4.1213 (0.0050) 4.1647 (0.0055) 4.1524 (0.0053) 3.6773 (0.0110) 3.5902 (0.0158) 
Education 0.0594 (0.0002) 0.0573 (0.0002) 0.0579 (0.0002) 0.0884 (0.0007) 0.0922 (0.0009) 
Experience 0.0181 (0.0003) 0.0180 (0.0003) 0.0181 (0.0003) 0.0166 (0.0004) 0.0169 (0.0003) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0269 (0.0011) -0.0274 (0.0011) -0.0272 (0.0011) -0.0034 (0.0013) -0.0036 (0.0013) 
Male 0.1336 (0.0009) 0.1332 (0.0009) 0.1334 (0.0009) 0.1218 (0.0010) 0.1235 (0.0010) 
IMR -  -0.0373 (0.0019) -0.0265 (0.0014) -  0.0988 (0.0039) 
Rho -  -0.1814  -0.1294 (0.0066) -  -  
Sigma -  0.2057  0.2052 (0.0003) -  -  
Adj. R2  0.4454   0.4038 0.3992 
- ln L   114 329   
Participants 287 449 287 449 287 449 287 449 287 449 
Population  387 017 387 017  387 017 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. Standard errors of the two-step estimates are corrected for the first stage uncertainty.   
 
Table A.22. Wage equations with endogenous schooling and selection correction, public sector females 
 OLS Two-step, Employment Two-step, Sector 2SLS, Education 2SLS w/ IMR 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept 4.1624 (0.0042) 4.1690 (0.0052) 4.2204 (0.0055) 3.9239 (0.0110) 3.8617 (0.0227) 
Education 0.0462 (0.0002) 0.0452 (0.0003) 0.0427 (0.0003) 0.0605 (0.0007) 0.0635 (0.0012) 
Experience 0.0098 (0.0003) 0.0099 (0.0003) 0.0103 (0.0003) 0.0082 (0.0003) 0.0078 (0.0004) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0142 (0.0011) -0.0150 (0.0011) -0.0171 (0.0011) 0.0015 (0.0014)   0.0036* (0.0016) 
IMR -  -0.0103 (0.0015) -0.0283 (0.0014) -  0.0377 (0.0038) 
Rho -  -0.0790  -0.2150  -  -  
Sigma -  0.1305  0.1317  -  -  
Adj. R2  0.4346   0.4095 0.4049 
Participants 105 635 105 635 105 635 105 635 105 635 
Population  225 643 225 643  225 643 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. Standard errors of the two-step estimates are corrected for the first stage uncertainty.   
* Insignificant for significance level 0.01. 
 
Table A.23. Wage equations with endogenous schooling and selection correction, private sector females 
 OLS Two-step, Employment Two-step, Sector 2SLS, Education 2SLS w/ IMR 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept 3.8676 (0.0106) 3.9455 (0.0114) 3.9203 (0.0110) 3.4111 (0.0228) 3.4649 (0.0250) 
Education 0.0642 (0.0005) 0.0615 (0.0005) 0.0651 (0.0005) 0.0938 (0.0014) 0.0960 (0.0015) 
Experience 0.0259 (0.0008) 0.0247 (0.0008) 0.0241 (0.0008) 0.0271 (0.0009) 0.0248 (0.0009) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0475 (0.0027) -0.0460 (0.0027) -0.0416 (0.0027) -0.0338 (0.0028) -0.0255 (0.0028) 
IMR -  -0.0497 (0.0028) -0.0519 (0.0027) -  -0.0685 (0.0031) 
Rho -  -0.2280  -0.2364  -  -  
Sigma -  0.2181  0.2194  -  -  
Adj. R2  0.3772   0.3376 0.3389 
Participants 59 521 59 521 59 521 59 521 59 521 
Population  225 643 225 643  225 643 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. Standard errors of the two-step estimates are corrected for the first stage uncertainty.   
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Table A.24. Wage equations with endogenous schooling and selection correction, public sector males 
 OLS Two-step, Employment Two-step, Sector 2SLS, Education 2SLS w/ IMR 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept 4.1964 (0.0097) 4.1798 (0.0128) 4.2265 (0.0127) 3.7315 (0.0251) 3.5603 (0.0519) 
Education 0.0489 (0.0004) 0.0497 (0.0006) 0.0474 (0.0006) 0.0717 (0.0016) 0.0835 (0.0028) 
Experience 0.0165 (0.0008) 0.0165 (0.0008) 0.0168 (0.0008) 0.0133 (0.0009) 0.0112 (0.0009) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0261 (0.0028) -0.0260 (0.0028) -0.0270 (0.0028)     0.0040** (0.0036)   0.0097* (0.0039) 
IMR -     0.0073* (0.0037) -0.0098 (0.0026) -  0.0954 (0.0084) 
Rho -  0.0428  -0.0573  -  -  
Sigma -  0.1702  0.1703  -  -  
Adj. R2  0.3799   0.3319 0.3130 
Participants 33 935 33 935 33 935 33 935 33 935 
Population  161 374 161 374  161 374 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. Standard errors of the two-step estimates are corrected for the first stage uncertainty.   
* Insignificant for significance level 0.01.  
** Insignificant for significance level 0.1. 
 
Table A.25. Wage equations with endogenous schooling and selection correction, private sector males 
 OLS Two-step, Employment Two-step, Sector 2SLS, Education 2SLS w/ IMR 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Intercept 3.8025 (0.0112) 3.8676 (0.0122) 3.8200 (0.0114) 3.0473 (0.0258) 3.0532 (0.0284) 
Education 0.0749 (0.0005) 0.0718 (0.0005) 0.0753 (0.0005) 0.1244 (0.0016) 0.1276 (0.0018) 
Experience 0.0331 (0.0009) 0.0333 (0.0009) 0.0327 (0.0009) 0.0313 (0.0009) 0.0303 (0.0009) 
Exp2 / 100 -0.0608 (0.0028) -0.0599 (0.0028) -0.0585 (0.0028) -0.0296 (0.0031) -0.0227 (0.0031) 
IMR -  -0.0668 (0.0048) -0.0301 (0.0035) -  -0.0691 (0.0043) 
Rho -  -0.2573  -0.1171  -  -  
Sigma -  0.2596  0.2573  -  -  
Adj. R2  0.3896   0.3082 0.3086 
Participants 88 358 88 358 88 358 88 358 88 358 
Population  161 374 161 374  161 374 
Region and industry controls are added to each regression. Standard errors of the two-step estimates are corrected for the first stage uncertainty.   
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